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NOT SO PRIVATE SEARCHES
AND THE CONSTITUTION
John M. Burkofft
One of the few longstanding benchmarks of constitutional
criminal procedure is that the exclusionary rule' does not apply
to evidence unearthed in unlawful searches or seizures 2 under-
taken by private individuals or entities not acting at the express
behest of state or federal agents or employees. As the Supreme
Court firmly, albeit parenthetically, declared in 1976, "It is well
established, of course, that the exclusionary rule, as a deterrent
sanction, is not applicable where a private party ... commits the
offending act."' The reason generally tendered for this proposi-
tion is that the fourth and fourteenth amendments, which sup-
port the exclusionary rule, apply only to the unconstitutional con-
duct of employees of the state or federal governments or their
agents.4
As with many such black-letter propositions, however, the
closer one scrutinizes the logical underpinnings of the private
search rule, the less firmly grounded it appears. There is good
reason, as a matter of settled fourth and fourteenth amendment
policy, to apply the exclusionary rule to the evidentiary fruits of
some unlawful "private searches." 5  The traditional treatment of
all private searches as a separate and distinct activity untainted by
"state involvement" is more an exercise in semantics than a sound
t Associate Professor of Law, University of Pittsburgh; A.B. 1970, J.D. 1973, Univer-
sity of Michigan; LL.M. 1976, Harvard. The author would like to express his apprecia-
tion to Yale Kamisar and F. Barry McCarthy for their helpful criticisms of an earlier draft
of this Article, to Wendy Newton for her superb research assistance, and to LuAnn Dris-
coll for supervising manuscript preparation.
The exclusionary rule permits courts to exclude the fruits of unconstitutional activ-
ity from admission into criminal proceedings against an appropriately wronged defendant.
See, e.g., Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961); Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383 (1914).
See also note 88 infra.
2 This Artide uses the term "unlawful searches and seizures" to classify activity that
violates statutory or common law; it should not be taken as signalling the unconstitutional-
ity of a particular act. Common examples of such unlawful activity would be trespass or
conversion.
' United States v. Janis, 428 U.S. 433, 456 n.31 (1976). See notes 209-27 and accompany-
ing text infa. Sm also Walter v. United States, 447 U.S. 649 (1980) (Stevens, J.); a at 660
(White, J., concurring in part); id. at 662 (Blackmun, J., dissenting); Coolidge v. New
Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 487 (1971).
4 See text accompanying notes 23-24 & 86-87 infra.
' See notes 48-80 and accompanying text infra.
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application of precedent, and it does not adequately account for
contemporary policing practices.6  State involvement with nomi-
nally private law enforcers is often pervasive even when it appears
to fall short of an actual agency relationship.7 This is particularly
true when the unlawful private search and seizure activity results
in criminal prosecution in state or federal criminal courts.,
This Article elaborates on the propositions sketched above,
analyzes the decisions and underlying doctrines that support
them, and suggests that the rigid conceptual distinction the Su-
preme Court has drawn between private and public searches is
not consistent with sound policy or constitutional principles. In
light of the development of fourth amendment and exclusionary
rule jurisprudence since 1960 and current "state action" doctrine,
many-if not most-of those searches deemed private under
existing Supreme Court precedent are simply not so private.
Accordingly, such activity should be considered state action for
exclusionary rule purposes if a criminal defendant with standing9
can show that the evidence in question was the fruit of an unlaw-
ful private search or seizure.
I
BURDEAU V. McDOWELL
The Supreme Court first established that private searches are
not covered by the fourth amendment in Burdeau v. McDowell,"'
decided in 1921. Jesse McDowell was a director and head of the
natural gas division of the Cities Service Company, as well as an
executive officer in various oil and gas companies owned and con-
trolled by Cities Service, including Quapaw Gas Company, a Cities
6 See notes 85-208 and accompanying text infra.
It is extremely difficult to determine whether or not an agency relationship exists.
As a general rule, "a search is not private in nature if it has been ordered or requested by
a government official." W. LAFAvE, 1 SEARCH AND SEIZURE 114 (1978). An actor is also an
"agent" of the government if public authorities have any "share ... in the total enterprise,"
although "[ilt is immaterial whether [the authorities] originated the idea or joined in it
while the search was in progress." Lustig v. United States, 338 U.S. 74, 79 (1949) (Frank-
furter, J.). See also Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 487 (1971).
Apart from clear instances of joint public-private endeavor, the case law is inconsistent
and confused. See W. LAFAvE, supra, at 85-91. This legal confusion is generally irrelevant
to this Article, however, which focuses on the "worst case"-those searches in which no
express governmental participation, instigation, orders, or requests can be found.
8 See text accompanying notes 185-99 and notes 202-08 and accompanying text infra.
' See note 88 infra.
10 256 U.S. 465 (1921).
628 [Vol. 66:627
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Service subsidiary. In early 1920, a colleague of McDowell, im-
mediately prior to committing suicide, confessed to Cities Service
management that he had defrauded the company by accepting
secret commissions on property sold to the various entities held by
Cities Service. In so confessing, he implicated McDowell in the
scheme." McDowell was immediately discharged by Cities Service
and Quapaw Gas Company. 2 After McDowell's discharge, Cities
Service sent company representatives and private detectives in
their hire to audit McDowell's books to determine the extent of
the company's financial damage. These Cities Service agents, with-
out consulting McDowell, searched his office suite 13 and seized
company and personal documents." After the Cities Service au-
ditors examined these documents, the company turned them over
to the U.S. Department of Justice '5 in the hope that the Depart-
ment would prosecute McDowell under federal criminal mail
fraud statutes. 16
McDowell petitioned a federal district court for an order
mandating the return of all "stolen" '7 documents, which he
" Brief for United States at 3, Burdeau v. McDowell, 256 U.S. 465 (1921).
12 Id.
1- Quapaw Gas Company leased an office for McDowell in the Farmer's Bank Building
in Pittsburgh; McDowell himself leased an adjoining room to create, along with the room
leased by Quapaw, a suite. McDowell used the room that he leased as his private office.
4 The private agents took the documents from McDowell's desk and from two safes
that they blew open. Although one of the safes was owned by Quapaw Gas Company, the
record firmly established that private papers belonging only to McDowell were taken from
that safe and from McDowell's personally owned desk and locked desk drawers. 256 U.S.
at 473. See also Brief for United States at 9, Burdeau v. McDowell, 256 U.S. 465 (1921).
5 The record does not indicate which materials were in the Justice Department's pos-
session at the time of the district court hearing. At least one of McDowell's personal letters
that had been taken from his desk was turned over to the government by Cities Service
representatives. A number of additional letters and portions of McDowell's diary seized in
the course of the same search also had apparently been offered to the Justice Department
by Cities Service. 256 U.S. at 474.
16 Appellee McDowell's Motion to Dismiss Appeal at 5, Burdeau v. McDowell, 256 U.S.
465 (1921); Brief for United States at 8-9, id.
17 The lawfulness of the Cities Service searches and seizures is problematic for other
reasons. The search of the safe owned by Quapaw Gas Company which was apparently
located in the room leased by Quapaw Gas Company might conceivably be held lawful
today, even if undertaken by law enforcement officers, depending upon resolution of fac-
tual questions with respect to McDowell's standing and legitimate expectations of privacy.
See, e.g., Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128 (1978); Mancusi v. DeForte, 392 U.S. 364 (1968).
The private seizures in this case, however, included seizure of documents other than those
in which Cities Service had any property right or interest, such as McDowell's personal
diary. See note 15 supra. In any event, the Supreme Court avoided this issue by concluding
without comment that the search and seizure of McDowell's "private property" was "illegal"
and "wrongful." 256 U.S. at 475.
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alleged were about to be submitted to a federal grand jury.18
Joseph Burdeau, a Special Assistant to the Attorney General, de-
fended the government's right to use the seized materials. The
district court granted McDowell's petition and directed the Justice
Department to return all the seized documents. 9 The govern-
ment was further directed not to present to the grand jury any
evidence obtained from the documents." The Supreme Court
reversed the district court's orders.
As one constitutional commentator recently suggested,
"[s]hoi-t opinions, like 'great' cases and 'hard' cases, often make
bad law." 2 1 The Supreme Court's treatment of the fourth
amendment issues of the lawfulness of the government's acquisi-
tion and use of stolen documents was not only short, it was sum-
mary. In two brief paragraphs entirely devoid of citation,2 2 Justice
Day, writing for himself and six of his brethren, held that fourth
amendment protections apply only "to governmental action." 23
The "origin and history [of the fourth amendment] clearly show,"
Justice Day continued, "that it was intended as a restraint upon
the activities of sovereign authority, and was not intended to be a
limitation upon other than governmental agencies .... 24
Justice Day concluded that because
the record clearly shows that no official of the Federal Govern-
ment had anything to do with the wrongful seizure of the peti-
tioner's property, or any knowledge thereof until several
months after the property had been taken from him and was in
the possession of the Cities Service Company [, i]t is manifest
that there was no invasion of the security afforded by the
Fourth Amendment against unreasonable search and seizure, as
whatever wrong was done was the act of individuals in taking
the property of another.25
'8 The district court concluded in its findings of fact that this was the Justice Depart-
ment's intent. 256 U.S. at 471-72.
'9 Id. at 471.
20 Id.
21 Schauer, "Private" Speech and the "Private" Forum: Givhan v. Western Line School
District, 1979 Sup. CT. REv. 217, 217 (footnote omitted).
2 In a preceding paragraph, the Court cited a series of cases, simply noting that "An
extended consideration of the origin and purposes of [the fourth and fifth] Amendments
would be superfluous in view of the fact that this court has had occasion to deal with those
subjects in a series of cases." 256 U.S. at 474.
" Id. at 475.
24 Id. See also text accompanying notes 86-87 infra.
25 256 U.S. at 475.
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Although the illegality of the private search activity led the
Supreme Court to assert that McDowell "has an unquestionable
right of redress against those who illegally and wrongfully took
his private property," 26 the right to such a private remedy was
held to be irrelevant to McDowell's right to an exclusionary re-
medy against the State.27
Justice Brandeis, joined by Justice Holmes, forcefully dis-
sented. That stolen documents ultimately were turned over to the
government for its use did not, in the dissent's view, cure the
initial unlawfulness of the seizure, nor should it end the constitu-
tional inquiry in criminal proceedings:
Plaintiff's private papers were stolen. The thief, to further
his own ends, delivered them to the law officer of the United
States. He, knowing them to have been stolen, retains them for
use against the plaintiff. Should the court permit him to do so?
.. I cannot believe that action of a public official is neces-
sarily lawful, because it does not violate constitutional prohibi-
tions and because the same result might have been attained by
other and proper means. At the foundation of our civil liberty
lies the principle which denies to government officials an ex-
ceptional position before the law and which subjects them to
the same rules of conduct that are commands to the citizen.
And in the development of our liberty insistence upon pro-
cedural regularity has been a large factor. Respect for law will
not be advanced by resort, in its enforcement, to means which
shock the common man's sense of decency and fair play.28
II
THE SILVER PLATTER DOCTRINE
Despite the eloquent Brandeis and Holmes dissent, Burdeau's
holding that private searches were not subject to constitutional
restrictions went largely unquestioned by the lower courts for
many years. This lack of critical attention might be explained by
the fact that a far more flagrant abuse of "prosecutorial etiquette"
was.being countenanced by the federal courts on the same theory.
26 Id.
" The Court's position was that the private individuals who committed the wrong were
not in any way involved in the criminal action brought by the state; hence, there was no
wrong committed by any party in those proceedings to remedy.
28 256 U.S. at 476-77. See also Black, Burdeau v. McDowell-A Judicial Milepost on the Road
to Absolutism, 12 B.U. L. REv. 32 (1932).
19811
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Until 1960, federal courts permitted the use of illegally seized evi-
dence in federal criminal trials when the seizure had been com-
mitted solely by state law enforcement officers or their agents
without intent to enforce federal law or involvement of federal
law enforcement authorities. 9
In Byars v. United States,'" a unanimous Supreme Court first
signalled its tolerance of such practices, concluding ipse dixit: "We
do not question the right of the federal government to avail itself
of evidence improperly seized by state officers operating entirely
upon their own account."' In such cases, the evidence was
turned over to federal agents "on a silver platter" and, because
federal agents were not themselves involved in illegal conduct, it
was available for use in federal criminal proceedings
s
.
3 2
See note 7 supra, and text accompanying notes 193-99 infra. The theory was that the
actions of federal law enforcement agents and prosecutorial officers were not constitu-
tionally tainted by the unlawful searches or seizures engaged in by others, which produced
evidentiary materials in the hands of federal authorities.
273 U.S. 28 (1927).
a' Id. at 33. See also Gambino v. United States, 275 U.S. 310, 314-18 (1927).
- Justice Frankfurter coined the term "silver platter" in Lustig v. United States, 338
U.S. 74, 79 (1949). Cases involving "reverse silver platter" practice-where federal law
enforcement agents turn illegally seized evidence over to state law enforcement agents-
were infrequent; it was not until 1961 that the Supreme Court held the exclusionary rule
binding upon the states. Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961). Hence, prior to Mapp, in the
absence of a state exclusionary statute or a state constitutional interpretation establishing
an exclusionary rule, illegally seized evidence could lawfully be admitted into evidence in
most state courts regardless of the source or manner of its acquisition. As a result, there
was little incentive prior to 1961 to litigate "reverse silver platter" questions.
It is noteworthy that Justices Holmes and Brandeis joined in the majority opinion in
Byars without separate opinion, despite their dissent six years earlier in Burdeau. See text
accompanying note 28 supra. Justice Frankfurter later argued that their concurrence indi-
cated that "in 1927 [they did not] question the right of the Federal Government to utilize
the very kind of evidence involved in [Burdeau and Byars]." Elkins v. United States, 364
U.S. 206, 235 (1960) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting). See also United States v. Newton, 510
F.2d 1149, 1154 n.5 (7th Cir. 1975). Justice Frankfurter's account is misleading, however.
Justices Holmes and Brandeis remained fiercely opposed to the silver platter doctrine in
general and specifically with reference to Burdeau. See, e.g., Letter from Louis D. Brandeis
to Felix Frankfurter (July 2, 1926), reprinted in 5 LErrERs or Louis D. BRANDEIS 227-29 (M.
Urofsky & D. Levy eds. 1978); Letter from Oliver Wendell Holmes to Sir Frederick Pollock
(June 20, 1928), reprinted in 2 HOLMEs-POLLOCK LETTERS 222-23 (M. Howe ed. 1941). See
also Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 469 (1928) (Holmes, J., dissenting); id. at 471
(Brandeis, J., dissenting). It is much more likely that they failed to write separately in Byars
because the sentence that countenanced the silver platter doctrine was dictum. The Byars
Court excluded the illegally seized evidence notwithstanding the silver platter doctrine be-
cause "the search in substance and effect was a joint operation of local and federal offi-
cers." 273 U.S. at 33. The decision in Gambino v. United States, 275 U.S. 310 (1927),
written by Justice Brandeis, was to similar effect. See text accompanying notes 184-90 infra.
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In 1949, the Supreme Court recast the Byars approval of the
"silver platter" practice as an open question, despite its apparent
gratuitous resolution (albeit in dictum) twenty-two years earlier."t
It was not until Elkins v. United States,34 decided in 1960, that the
Court finally discarded the Byars dictum. Elkins involved a federal
prosecution initiated on the basis of evidence seized by state law
enforcement agents in Oregon using a search warrant that a state
court subsequently held invalid under Oregon law. Because of the
warrant's invalidity, the state court suppressed all evidence seized
and dismissed the state indictment. 5 A five-Justice majority of
the Supreme Court invoked its supervisory power to suppress the
illegally seized evidence in federal criminal proceedings. Justice
Stewart, writing for the majority, gave three reasons for repudiat-
ing the silver platter doctrine.
First, although the Court had not yet held the exclusionary
rule applicable to the states through the fourteenth amendment
(something it would do the very next Term in Mapp v. Ohio "'),
Justice Stewart stated that it had been "unequivocally determined
by a unanimous Court that the Federal Constitution, by virtue of
the Fourteenth Amendment, prohibits unreasonable searches and
seizures by state officers." 31 Therefore, Justice Stewart con-
tinued, "the doctrinal underpinning for the admissibility rule"38 in
silver platter cases had been destroyed:
[S]urely no distinction can logically be drawn between evidence
obtained in violation of the Fourth Amendment and that
obtained in violation of the Fourteenth. The Constitution is
flouted equally in either case. To the victim it matters not
s Lustig v. United States, 338 U.S. 74 (1949). Justice Murphy, joined by Justices Doug-
las and Rutledge, concurred in Lustig because this question was left open and not decided
adversely to the government. Justice Murphy noted that, "In my opinion the important
consideration is the presence of an illegal search. Whether state or federal officials did the
searching is of no consequence to the defendant, and it should make no difference to us."
Id. at 80.
- 364 U.S. 206 (1960).
15 Id. at 207 n.l. The facts in Elkins graphically illustrate "silver platter" practice:
During the course of these state proceedings federal officers, acting under a
federal search warrant, obtained the articles from the safe-deposit box of a
local bank where the state officials had placed them. Shortly after the state case
was abandoned, a federal indictment was returned, and the instant [federal]
prosecution followed.
Id.
- 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
-7 364 U.S. at 213. The Court's reference is to the decision of Wolf v. Colorado, 338
U.S. 25 (1949).
31 364 U.S. at 213.
1981]
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whether his constitutional right has been invaded by a federal
agent or by a state officer.s9
Because unlawful searches or seizures undertaken by state law en-
forcement agents clearly violated the federal fourteenth amend-
ment, the argument that only violations of the fourth amendment
by federal law enforcement officers require evidentiary exclusion
in federal criminal proceedings "would appear to reflect an
indefensibly selective evaluation of the provisions of the Constitu-
tion." 4  When state officials violate the fourteenth amendment,
the damage to individual liberty is obviously no less severe or
unconstitutional than when federal officials violate the fourth
amendment.
The Court's second ground for rejecting the silver platter
doctrine was the deterrent impact of applying an exclusionary
sanction to this practice. 4' Although the Supreme Court remains
reluctant to draw firm conclusions about the deterrent efficacy of
the exclusionary rule as an empirical matter,"2 a reluctance
expressed as early as the decision in Elkins," the silver platter doc-
trine presented a strong case for a pragmatic assumption of deter-
rent efficacy. It was clear to the Elkins Court that the silver platter
doctrine had created a substantial disincentive for state law en-
forcement officials to obey the Constitution because they could
accomplish the very same law enforcement objectives by turning
illegally seized evidence over to federal authorities."
39 Id. at 215 (footnote omitted). Justice Murphy made this argument in Lustig. See note
33 supra.
40 364 U.S. at 215.
4' The argument that the exclusionary rule is constitutionally rooted in the fourth (and
fourteenth) amendments is a longstanding one rejected at present by a majority of the
Supreme Court. See Burkoff, The Court that Devoured the Fourth Amendment: The Triumph of
an Inconsistent Exclusionary Doctrine, 58 OR. L. REv. 151, 184-87 (1979). However, the mar-
ginal deterrence question that the Elkins Court faced in exercising its supervisory power is
relevant today when the Court decides whether the fourth amendment itself requires that
the exclusionary remedy be applied in a particular case. See note 50 infra.
I See United States v. Janis, 428 U.S. 433, 450 n. 22 (1976); Burkoff, supra note 41, at
157-58 n.25.
43 364 U.S. at 218.
In this light, the effects on federalism of rejecting the silver platter doctrine clearly
were salutary. As Justice Stewart eloquently reasoned for the majority:
[W]hen a federal court sitting in an exclusionary state admits evidence lawlessly
seized by state agents, it not only frustrates state policy, but frustrates that pol-
icy in a particularly inappropriate and ironic way. For by admitting the unlaw-
fully seized evidence the federal court serves to defeat the state's effort to
assure obedience to the Federal Constitution. In states which have not adopted
634 [Vol. 66:627
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Finally, the Elkins majority offered what arguably was the
most important reason for employing its supervisory power to re-
ject the silver platter doctrine: "the imperative of judicial
integrity." 4 Harkening back to the dissenting opinions of Justices
Holmes and Brandeis in the mid-1920s, 46 Justice Stewart con-
cluded that
"a conviction resting on evidence secured through such a fla-
grant disregard of the procedure which Congress has com-
manded cannot be allowed to stand without making the courts
themselves accomplices in the willful disobedience of law." ...
Even less should the federal courts be accomplices in the willful
disobedience of a Constitution they are sworn to uphold.47
III
Burdeau AND THE SILVER PLATTER DOCTRINE
Although the Supreme Court has not reconsidered Burdeau
in light of the demise of the silver platter doctrine, there is a
strong argument to be made that the Elkins rationales apply with
equal force to private searches.48 Assuming for the moment that
private persons can commit unconstitutional searches and
the exclusionary rule, on the other hand, it would work no conflict with local
policy for a federal court to decline to receive evidence unlawfully seized by
state officers. The question with which we deal today affects not at all the free-
dom of the states to develop and apply their own sanctions in their own
way....
Free and open cooperation between state and federal law enforcement
officers is to be commended and encouraged. Yet that kind of cooperation is
hardly promoted by a rule that implicitly invites federal officers to withdraw
from such association and at least tacitly to encourage state officers in the disre-
gard of constitutionally protected freedom. If, on the other hand, it is under-
stood that the fruit of an unlawful search by state agents will be inadmissable in
a federal trial, there can be no inducement to subterfuge and evasion with
respect to federal-state cooperation in criminal investigation. Instead, forthright
cooperation under constitutional standards will be promoted and fostered.
Id. at 221-22 (citation omitted).
'5 Id. at 222.
41 Id. at 222-23. Citation was to the famous Holmes and Brandeis dissenting opinions
in Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438 (1928). See text accompanying note 77 supra.
47 364 U.S. at 223 (quoting McNabb v. United States, 318 U.S. 332 (1943)).
4' The Supreme Court in the 1920s clearly saw the "private search doctrine" and the
"silver platter doctrine" as part and parcel of the same issue. Indeed, the 1925 Supreme
Court summarily applied the Burdeau decision to affirm a conviction based upon silver
platter evidence seized by state authorities. Center v. United States, 267 U.S. 575 (1925)
(facts reported in Gambino v. United States, 275 U.S. 310, 317 (1927)).
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seizures, 49 Justice Stewart's reasoning in Elkins directly supports
the application of an exclusionary remedy to the fruits of illegal
private searches.
Justice Stewart hinged resolution of Elkins, at least in part, on
the question of marginal deterrence: to what extent the Court
could perceive a benefit flowing from the discouragement of un-
constitutional conduct through the use of the exclusionary rule in
the particular setting. In Elins, eliminating the silver platter
doctrine eliminated any incentive for federal law enforcement
authorities to rely upon the illegal acts of state law enforcement
authorities. The Elkins decision also discouraged state law enforce-
ment authorities from participating in illegal searches and seizures.
Similarly, excluding evidence derived from illegal private searches
would deter law enforcement authorities from subtly-or openly-
encouraging such violations.
The constitutional analysis in the private search setting
should focus on the marginally deleterious effect on constitutional
rights of the State's acquiescence in such illegal conduct.0 As the
Elkins Court observed, "To the victim it matters not whether his
constitutional right has been invaded by a federal agent or a state
officer."51 Similarly, victims of unlawful private conduct care lit-
"' See notes 85-208 and accompanying text infra. Of course, this proposition is critical.
To the extent the argument fails on this point, Elkins and Burdeau can be superficially
reconciled by concluding, as has Professor LaFave, that "Elkins never mentioned Burdeau,
and the reasoning employed in Elkins was specifically directed to searches by state offi-
ials." W. LAFAVE, supra note 7, at 111-12 (footnote omitted). More fundamentally, these two
cases could be distinguished because in Elkins the search by the state officers did violate the
fourth amendment under Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25 (1949).
'o Because the Burger Court has not deemed the exclusionary rule to be of constitu-
tional dimension, see note 41 supra, it has premised the availability of the exclusionary rule
in criminal proceedings upon the existence of a deterrent effect on unlawful conduct. "If
... the exclusionary rule does not result in appreciable deterrence, then, Clearly, its use ...
is unwarranted." United States v. Janis, 428 U.S. 433, 454 (1976) (footnote omitted). See
also Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465 (1976); United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338 (1974).
Recent Supreme Court cases, however, particularly those decided in the area of fourth
amendment standing, do not fully take deterrence into account in applying the exclusion-
ary rule. See Burkoff, supra note 41, at 176-77 ("current Supreme Court exclusionary prac-
tice . . . creates no disincentive to the illegal harassment of those individuals who are not
the ultimate target of police activity") (footnote omitted). Although such cases may dimin-
ish the value of the deterrence inquiry as the sole exclusionary litmus test, the Supreme
Court may have limited the role of deterrence only in cases "where the illegal conduct did
not violate the ... rights [of the actor seeking to invoke the exclusionary rule] .... United
States v. Payner, 447 U.S. 727, 735 n.8 (1980). In the present context, therefore, the
marginal deterrence question should be viewed as significant only when the defendant
seeks to remedy the violation of his own "personal" rights. See note 88 infra.
si 364 U.S. at 215. See also note 33 supra.
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ie whether they have fallen prey to illegal law enforcement con-
duct or nominally private searches. As the Pennsylvania Supreme
Court stated:
[I]f detectives and private intermeddlers may, without legal re-
sponsibility, peer through keyholes, eavesdrop at the table, lis-
ten at the transom and over the telephone, and crawl under the
bed, then all constitutional guarantees become meaningless
aggregation of words, as disconnected as a broken necklace
whose beads have scattered on the floor.52
The deleterious impact on individual liberty of sustained un-
constitutional-like conduct is as pronounced when the source of
such conduct is nominally private activity as it is when it results
from the explicit activity of the State. Indeed, in Marsh v.
Alabama,53 the Supreme Court concluded in an analogous vein54
that the mere fact that activity which would have constituted sub-
stantial and continuing deprivations of right if undertaken by
state officials was undertaken instead by a private entity was "not
sufficient to justify the State's permitting [that private entity] to
govern a community of citizens so as to restrict their fundamental
liberties.... 5 5  One commentator reasons:
[T]he rationale underlying Marsh seems equally applicable in
the situation where the state permits private organizations to
perform police functions. The danger of recurrent invasions of
privacy resulting from the assumption of that public function
indicates that institutionalized private searches should be sub-
ject to constitutional standards. 56
Some commentators, however, have questioned the deterrent
effect of extending the exclusionary rule to private searches. Pro-
" Commonwealth v. Murray, 423 Pa. 37, 51-52, 223 A.2d 102, 110 (1966). See also
Lebel v. Swincicki, 354 Mich. 427, 440, 93 N.W.2d 281, 287 (1958) (civil proceedings);
State v. Helfrich, - Mont. -, 600 P.2d 816, 818-19 (1979); State v. Coburn, 165 Mont.
488, 493-94, 530 P.2d 442, 450-51 (1974); State v. Brecht, 157 Mont. 264, 270, 485 P.2d
47, 50-51 (1971); Commonwealth v. Eshelman, 477 Pa. 93, 102, 383 A.2d 838, 842-43
(1978).
326 U.S. 501 (1946).
The Marsh Court considered whether the first amendment forbids criminal punish-
ment of a person for distributing religious literature on the sidewalk of a company-owned
town contrary to regulations of the town's management, where the town was generally
accessible to the public.
51 326 U.S. at 509. See also id. at 510-11 (Frankfurter, J., concurring); Evans v. Newton,
382 U.S. 296, 299 (1966); People v. Zelinski, 24 Cal. 3d 357, 368, 594 P.2d 1000, 1006,
155 Cal. Rptr. 575, 581 (1979); Stapleton v. Superior Court of Los Angeles County, 70
Cal. 2d 97, 103 n.4, 447 P.2d 967, 971 n.4, 73 Cal. Rptr. 575, 579 n.4 (1969).
1981]
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fessor Wayne LaFave, for example, has argued "that the exclu-
sionary rule would not likely deter the private searcher, who is
often motivated by reasons independent of a desire to secure
criminal conviction and who seldom engages in searches upon a
sufficiently regular basis to be affected by the exclusionary
sanction." 5 7  This view fails to recognize the variety and number
of private searches and searchers potentially at issue. There are
over 1,000,000 individuals employed today in the private security
business alone," many of whom are retained strictly to engage in
law-enforcement-like behavior. 9 As one state supreme court
observed, arguments such as that posed by Professor LaFave
"erroneously characterize the 'private person' as the little old lady
next door who has a desire to assist in law enforcement."" But
individuals-whether they be private police, little old ladies, or
anyone else-who lawfully attempt to assist the police or who
simply stumble upon evidence that might aid law enforcement
efforts, are not even a part of the private search controversy.
Their efforts are by definition lawful and constitutional.6 '
Moreover, some commentators observe that many private
actors are well aware that they are virtually immune from
56 Note, Seizure by Private Parties: Exclusion in Criminal Cases, 19 STAN. L. REv. 608, 617
(1967). For a discussion of the "public function" aspects of Marsh and other Supreme
Court decisions, see notes 85-160 and accompanying text infra. See also Note, Private
Assumption of the Police Function Under the Fourth Amendment, 51 B.U. L. Rxv. 464, 474-75
(1971); Note, 12 U.C.L.A. L. R v. 232, 236 n.29 (1964). But see W. LAFAvE, supra note 7, at
128.
The holding in Marsh has more recently been limited in application as a matter of
federal constitutional law to "an economic anomaly of the past, 'the company town.'"
loyd Corp., Ltd. v. Tanner, 407 U.S. 551, 561 (1972). But cf. PruneYard Shopping Center
v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74 (1980) (involving state constitutional law). See also Flagg
Brothers, Inc. v. Brooks, 436 U.S. 149, 159 (1978); Hudgens v. NLRB, 424 U.S. 507,
514-17 (1976). It is also noteworthy, as the Court observed in Tanner, that the company
town in Marsh was held to be distinctive precisely because it provided "the customary ser-
vices and utilities normally afforded by a municipal or state government [including] police
... protection .... " 407 U.S. at 562. See related discussion at text accompanying notes
127-39 infra.
-" W. LAFAVE, supra note 7, at 113. See also Brief for the United States at 24, Walter v.
United States, 447 U.S. 649 (1980); People v. Botts, 250 Cal. App. 2d 478, 482-83, 58 Cal.
Rptr. 412, 415-16 (1967).
See note 95 infra.
See text accompanying notes 145-48, infra. See also People v. Zelinski, 24 Cal. 3d 357,
366, 594 P.2d 1000, 1005, 155 Cal. Rptr. 575, 580 (1979) ("[P]rivate security personnel ...
may regularly perform ... quasi-law enforcement activities in the course of their employ-
ment.").
0 State v. Coburn, 165 Mont. 488, 502, 530 P.2d 442, 450 (1974).
6' The Supreme Court has reasoned that "it is no part of the policy underlying the
Fourth and Fourteenth amendments to discourage citizens from aiding to the utmost of
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sanction when they commit unlawful searches and seizures.62
Certainly such individuals are not often brought to task for the
consequences of their illegal activity. A Rand Corporation study
completed in 1977 reported:
It does not appear from public records that prosecutions for
illegal searches [by private actors] are frequent ... [T]he nature
of the material that is the object of the search might be such as
to deter any potential plaintiff from filing charges; the owner
of the property may not be aware of the search or may not
realize it is illegal; or the wronged citizen may simply complain
without seeking prosecution because he is unaware of how to
proceed or because he wishes to avoid the bother and expense
of litigation.0s
Thus, because the courts refuse to exclude evidence illegally
obtained by private actors and because the government rarely
prosecutes those guilty of such private conduct, individuals may
jeopardize the privacy rights of others with virtual impunity.6
their ability in the apprehension of criminals." Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443,
488 (1971). However, the Coolidge Court was referring to police tactics urging Mrs.
Coolidge to produce evidence hidden in her home linking her husband to criminal activity.
Production of such evidence was perfectly lawful on her part because the evidence was
produced voluntarily and was secreted in areas where she had full control. See Walter v.
United States, 447 U.S. 649, 652 n.2 (1980) (White, J.). Obviously, lawful cooperation with
the police in all their investigatory endeavors is both welcome and, perhaps, even necessary
in an orderly society. The Coolidge language, however, does not apply where private
citizens are encouraged to commit unlawful acts. It is difficult, if not impossible, to argue
that the Supreme Court in Coolidge-or any other case-intended to indicate that the
fourth and fourteenth amendments were themselves intended, in part, to encourage the
commission of lawless private activity.
62 See, e.g., J. KA.ALiK & S. WuHoaN, THE PsvATE POLICE: SECURITY AND DANGER
209, 223, 228-29 (1977); Comment, Private Police Forces: Legal Powers and Limitations, 38 U.
Ci. L. REv. 555, 569-70 (1971); Note, The Fourth Amendment Right of Privacy: Mapping the
Future, 53 VA. L. REv. 1314, 1350 (1967).
3 J. KAKAY.u & S. WnL om, supra note 62, at 235. The Supreme Court has recognized
the futility of relying upon non-exclusionary remedies to protect fourth amendment rights.
In Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154, 169 (1978), the Court reaffirmed that "the alternative
sanctions of a perjury prosecution, administrative discipline, contempt, or a civil suit are
not likely to fill the gap. Mapp v. Ohio implicitly rejected the adequacy of those alterna-
tives." Because the alternative of administrative sanction is even less generally available in
the context of private searches, it might be argued that such searches present an even
more compelling case than police searches for reliance upon the remedial protections of
the exclusionary rule.
" "For example, private investigators, utilized by both domestic and business interests,
commonly conduct illegal searches of dwellings and engage in illicit surveillance activities,
primarily to obtain information for use in a civil action or to influence some private deci-
sion or venture." Comment, supra note 62, at 569-70 (1971) (footnotes omitted).
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Finally, commentators who argue that exclusion will not
effectively deter private actors overlook another aspect of deter-
rence in the private search and seizure context. The most signifi-
cant deterrent effect of applying an exclusionary rule in this set-
ting may well be to discourage law enforcement agents from
encouraging or entering into unlawful, sub rosa compacts with
private actors. The Elkins Court observed that the failure to exclude
evidence illegally seized by state officials would induce federal
officials to withdraw from formal cooperation with state law en-
forcement authorities "tacitly to encourage ... the disregard of
constitutionally protected freedom." 63 Applying this reasoning to
private searches,
the grave danger exists that the general admissibility of such
evidence [illegally seized by private persons] ... may create an
atmosphere encouraging government officials to act in clandes-
tine concert with private persons; while concerted activity
would undoubtedly taint such evidence and require its exclu-
sion in a criminal action, the problems of proof are obvious.6
Even Professor LaFave concedes that this point is "[tihe soundest
anti-Burdeau argument." 6
Professor LaFave also puts too great a burden of proof on
those seeking to apply the exclusionary rule to private searches.
Presumably, he would not argue that a state police officer who is
motivated by reasons other than a desire to secure criminal con-
viction (for example, simple harassment), and who seldom en-
gages in searches on a regular basis, should be held immune from
silver platter exclusion.68  Admitting the fruits of illegal private
searches into evidence frustrates the enforcement of state civil
and criminal laws to the same extent as if police violations had
produced the same evidence. Indeed, the social costs may be far
higher in the former case; the wages of the state's assisting-or
merely tolerating- vigilantism are obvious. Moreover, an antiso-
cial animus may more often motivate private searches than the
I' Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206, 221-22 (1960).
13 63 COLUM. L. REv. 168, 174-75 (1963) (footnotes omitted). See aso 16 Am. U. L. REv.
403, 407-08 (1967); 90 HARv. L. REV. 463, 467 (1976); 1966 UTAH L. REV. 271, 276.
67 W. LAFAV E, supra note 7, at 114 n.24.
I Professor LaFave has, however, recently concluded that a police officer's improper
motive in searching should not suffice to support an exclusionary remedy in the absence of
deviation from "usual police practices." W. LAFAvE, supra note 7, at 15-18 (1981 Supp.).
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searches of the police, which generally are spurred by a good
faith desire to enforce the law.
The argument for applying the exclusionary rule to illegal
private searches, however, is supported by more than the possible
deterrent effects of such a rule. The Elkins Court also based its
unequivocal rejection of the silver platter doctrine on the "im-
perative of judicial integrity."69  Professor LaFave and others
have argued that judicial integrity is not relevant in assessing the
continuing vitality of Burdeau, however, because "it would seem
that where the conduct in question is by private individuals rather
than the police 'the courts do not, by using this evidence, condone
the actions of the individual."'"70 What authority can be garnered
for this normative proposition? No intuitively obvious moral dis-
tinction exists between prosecutorial use and judicial acceptance
of evidence illegally seized by the police and that seized by private
actors." More important, focusing on "condonation" miscon-
ceives the judicial integrity argument. The Supreme Court has re-
cently reaffirmed that "the Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule
... is applied in part 'to protect the integrity of the court rather
than to vindicate the constitutional rights of the defen-
dant ..... "7 Following the lead of Brandeis and Holmes,
the Elkins Court similarly held that the silver platter doctrine
tainted the judiciary itself because it forced courts to become
"accomplices in willful disobedience of law." 73 Brandeis and
Holmes had argued this point in their dissent in Burdeau. It was
not condoning crime that was at issue but rather the courts'
participation in the criminal act itself:
At the foundation of our civil liberty lies the principle which
denies to government officials an exceptional position before
the law and which subjects them to the same rules of conduct
9 See text accompanying notes 45-46 supra.
70 W. LAFAVE, supra note 7, at 113 (footnotes omitted) (quoting State v. Rice, 110
Ariz. 210, 212, 516 P.2d 1222, 1224 (1973)).
71 "[Wihile the Government will not be a thief through the agency of one of its own
officers, it has no compunction against acting as the 'fence' for an unofficial thief. Strange
as this doctrine may seem, it has been approved by the Supreme Court in the case of
Burdeau v. McDowell . Knox, Self Incrimination, 74 PA. L. REv. 139, 144-45 (1925).
7' United States v. Payner, 447 U.S. 727, 736 n.8 (1980) (emphasis in original) (quoting
id. at 747 (Marshall, J., dissenting)).
73 Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206, 223 (1960) (quoting McNabb v. United States,
318 U.S. 332, 345 (1943)). See also United States v. Payner, 447 U.S. 727, 744 (1980)
(Marshall, J., dissenting).
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that are commands to the citizen. And in the development of
our liberty insistence upon procedural regularity has been a
large factor.74
Such "procedural irregularity" as acceptance and utilization of
illegally seized evidence as the basis for conviction should itself be
considered an unlawful act. Indeed, merely accepting the fruits of
unlawful private searches may be seen as an unconstitutional "sei-
zure" by the State.75
The State cannot with equanimity process law breakers while
participating in law breaking itself.76  The Elkins Court quoted
Justice Brandeis to emphasize the point: "If the Government be-
comes a lawbreaker, it breeds contempt for law; it invites every
man to become a law unto himself; it invites anarchy." 77 This is
no metaphysical question of condonation. The more basic and sig-
nificant issue is the State's affirmation of its own democratic
norms through its adherance to the rule of law.
In short, as a few courts have perspicaciously held,78 the
Elkins decision is nothing short of total acceptance of the philoso-
phy that guided Brandeis and Holmes, the Burdeau dissenters. As
one state supreme court concluded, the Elkins Court condemned
"the silver platter concept ... in any context." 79  And, as Judge
Wisdom of the Fifth Circuit recently expostulated, the private
" Burdeau v. McDowell, 256 U.S. 465, 477 (1921) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
71 See text accompanying note 186 infra.
' See United States v. Payner, 447 U.S. 727, 746-47 (1980) (Marshall, J., dissenting).
See also United States v. Cortina, 630 F.2d 1207, 1216-17 (7th Cir. 1980).
" Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206, 223 (1960) (quoting Olmstead v. United States,
277 U.S. 438, 485 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting)). See also Burkoff, supra note 41, at
174-75.
78 See, e.g., United States v. Williams, 314 F.2d 795, 796-97 (6th Cir. 1963); Williams v.
United States, 282 F.2d 940, 941 (6th Cir. 1960); People v. Botts, 250 Cal. App. 2d 478,
481-82, 58 Cal. Rptr. 412, 415 (1967); Moody v. United States, 163 A.2d 337 (Mun. Ct.
D.C. 1960); State v. Coburn, 165 Mont. 488, 492-504, 530 P.2d 442, 445-51 (1974); Del
Presto v. Del Presto, 92 N.J. Super. 305, 307, 223 A.2d 217, 218 (1966), rev'd, 97 N.J.
Super. 446, 235 A.2d 240 (1967); Sackler v. Sackler, 33 Misc. 2d 600, 603-04, 224 N.Y.S.
2d 790, 793, rev'd., 16 A.D.2d 423, 229 N.Y.S.2d 61 (1962), affd., 15 N.Y.2d 40, 203
N.E.2d 481, 255 N.Y.S.2d 83 (1964) (Van Voorhis, Bergan, J.J., dissenting). See also
Sutherland, Use of Illegally Seized Evidence in Non-Criminal Proceedings, 4 CRIM. L. BuL.. 215,
222 (1968); Note, supra note 62, at 1350-51; Note, Seizure by Private Parties: Exclusion in
Criminal Cases, 19 STAN. L. REv. 608, 610 n.16 (1967); 12 U.C.L.A. L. REv. 232, 234-35
(1964); 48 CORNELL L.Q. 345, 347 n.13 (1963). But see United States v. Harper, 458 F.2d
891, 893 n.2 (7th Cir. 1971); United States v. McGuire, 381 F.2d 306, 314 n.5 (2d Cir.
1967), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 1053 (1968); United States v. Goldberg, 330 F.2d 30, 35 (3d
Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 377 U.S. 953 (1964); People v. Horman, 22 N.Y.2d 378, 381-82,
239 N.E.2d 625, 627-28, 292 N.Y.S.2d 874, 876-77, cert. denied, 393 U.S. 1057 (1968).
7 State v. Coburn, 165 Mont. 488, 503, 530 P.2d 442, 450 (1974).
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search doctrine "permits the government to accomplish circui-
tously what it could not accomplish directly.... [I]t is the twin of
'silver platter' doctrine that allowed federal prosecutors to use
illegal evidence independently obtained by state and local
officers." 80  Courts should not tolerate an artificial distinction
under the fourth amendment between private and public
searches. Eliminating this distinction would not only deter the
violation of individual rights, but would eliminate the sordid spec-
tre of the State seeking to secure criminal convictions based in
whole or in part upon evidence seized by illegal-even criminal-
acts.
IV
THE STATE ACTION CONTROVERSY
The threshold constitutional inquiry in any debate over
whether the fruits of illegal private searches may be excluded
from criminal trials is whether private individuals can ever act un-
constitutionally with respect to search and seizure violations. The
fourth"' and fourteenth82 amendments to the Constitution have
traditionally been interpreted as applying only to the conduct of
sovereign entities within our federal system." To the extent that
entitlement to an exclusionary remedy derives from the existence
8 United States v. Sanders, 592 F.2d 788, 801 (5th Cir. 1979) (Wisdom, J., dissenting),
rev'd sub. nom. Walter v. United States, 447 U.S. 649 (1980). See also United States v.
Kelly, 529 F.2d 1365, 1371-72 (8th Cir. 1976).
81 The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and
effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and
no warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by oath or
affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the per-
sons or things to be seized.
U.S. CoNsT. amend. IV.
8 All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the juris-
diction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein they
reside. No state shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the pri-
vileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State de-
prive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor
deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.
U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
83 The fourth amendment restricts the permissible search and seizure activities of fed-
eral law enforcement authorities, see, e.g., Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383 (1914); the
fourteenth amendment, incorporating fourth amendment restrictions on searches and sei-
zures, restricts state law enforcement activity, see, e.g., Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961);
Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25 (1949).
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of a violation of the fourth or fourteenth amendments, it would
appear that unlawful acts carried out by private actors where no
''state action" is implicated would not-could not-be deemed
unconstitutional in se so as to trigger exclusionary protections.
This is the doctrinal position the Supreme Court adopted in Bur-
deau v. McDowell. 4 Analysis under two separate but related
strands of the state action doctrine, however, yields a contrary
conclusion.
A. The Public-Function Doctrine
There is good reason to conclude that certain significant
categories of private searches, although not conducted by actors
in an express agency relationship with the State,"5 are nonetheless
suffused with state action for constitutional purposes. Such activ-
ity should be subject to constitutional restrictions on the scope and
nature of search and seizure activity."6 As the Supreme Court has
stated, "[W]hen private individuals or groups are endowed by the
State with powers or functions governmental in nature, they be-
come agencies or instrumentalities of the State and subject to its
constitutional limitations."87  Accordingly, fourth amendment
violations committed by private actors whose conduct is freighted
with state action should trigger an exclusionary remedy as a mat-
ter of right for a wronged criminal defendant.88
Assessing whether or not state action is present in a given
case or context is, however, tricky and uncertain. The Supreme
' "The Fourth Amendment gives protection against unlawful searches and seizures,
and ... its protection applies to governmental action. Its origin and history clearly show
that it was intended as a restraint upon the activities of sovereign authority, and was not
intended to be a limitation upon other than governmental agencies .. ." 256 U.S. 465, 475
(1921). See also Walter v. United States, 447 U.S. 649, 656 (1980) (Stevens, J.); id at 660
(White, J.); id. at 662 (Blackmun, J. dissenting); United States v. Janis, 428 U.S. 433, 455-56
n.31 (1976); Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 487 (1971).
8 See note 7 supra.
Otherwise, "the principle that private action is immune from the restrictions of the
Fourteenth Amendment is well established and easily stated .... Jackson v. Metropolitan
Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345, 349 (1974). See also Burton v. Wilmington Parking Auth., 365
U.S. 715, 722 (1961).
81 Evans v. Newton, 382 U.S. 296, 299 (1966). See also Home Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Los
Angeles, 227 U.S. 278, 285-86 (1913).
68 A criminal defendant must, however, be able to demonstrate a violation of "per-
sonal" fourth amendment rights before he may claim the right to an exclusionary remedy. See
United States v. Payner, 447 U.S. 727 (1980); Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 133-34
(1978). See also Burkoff, supra note 41, at 165-67; note 50 supra. Therefore, use of evidence
wrongfully seized by a private actor from a defendant who would lack standing had the
search and seizure been carried out by law enforcement authorities would be constitutional
under current fourth amendment and supervisory powers decisions.
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Court has warned, "To fashion and apply a precise formula for
recognition of state responsibility ... is an 'impossible task' which
'This Court has never attempted.' ... Only by sifting facts and
weighing circumstances can the nonobvious involvement of the
State in private conduct be attributed its true significance." 9 The
Court has further concluded that the existence of state action
hinges on "whether there is a sufficiently close nexus between the
State and the challenged action ... so that the action ... may be
fairly treated as that of the State itself." 90
Of late, the Supreme Court has been reluctant to find state
action in problematic activity.91 Nonetheless, the Court recently
reaffirmed that such a "sufficiently close nexus" with state activity
does exist under the so-called "public-function doctrine" where a
court finds "the exercise by a private entity of powers traditionally
exclusively reserved to the State." 92  Furthermore, the Burger
Court93 has concluded that the key factor in its public-function
analysis is the requirement of "exclusivity." However, as the Court
recently observed: "While many functions have been traditionally
" Burton v. Wilmington Parking Auth., 365 U.S. 715, 722 (1961) (quoting Kotch v.
River Port Pilot Comm'rs., 330 U.S. 552, 556 (1947)). See also Gilmore v. City of Montgom-
ery, 417 U.S. 556, 573-74 (1974); Moose Lodge No. 107 v. Irvis, 407 U.S. 163, 172 (1972);
Reitman v. Mulkey, 387 U.S. 369, 378 (1967); Evans v. Newton, 382 U.S. 296, 299 (1966).
90 Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345, 351 (1974) (citing Moose Lodge
No. 107 v. Irvis, 407 U.S. 163, 176 (1972)).
", See, e.g., Flagg Bros. Inc. v. Brooks, 436 U.S. 149 (1978); Jackson v. Metropolitan
Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345 (1974); Moose Lodge No. 107 v. Irvis, 407 U.S. 163 (1972). Cf.
United States v. Orleans, 425 U.S. 807 (1976) (federally funded community action agency
not a federal agency for purpose of Federal Torts Claims Act). For a critical discussion of
this line of cases, see L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAw 108 (1979 Supp.).
Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345, 352 (1974) (citing Evans v. New-
ton, 382 U.S. 296 (1966); Terry v. Adams, 345 U.S. 461 (1953); Marsh v. Alabama, 326
U.S. 501 (1946); Nixon v. Condon, 286 U.S. 73 (1932)). However, those cited decisions
employed a substantially less exacting test for finding public-function state action. See, e.g.,
text accompanying notes 53-56 & 81 supra; L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
1163-67 (1978); The Supreme Court, 1977 Term, 92 HARV. L. REV. 57, 127-29 (1978). See also
text accompanying notes 124-27 infra.
9 The term "Burger Court" is used to demarcate the period from the appointment of
Warren Burger as Chief Justice of the Supreme Court on June 23, 1969, to the present.
Although there may be methodological and philosophical problems in treating the Su-
preme Court as an entity doctrinally divisible by the tenure of respective Chief Justices,
there are significant differences between the Warren and Burger Courts' treatment of
constitutional criminal procedure issues. See C. WHITEBREAD, WHITEBREAD ON CRIMINAL
PROCEDURE 4 n.24 (1980); Allen, The Judicial Quest for Penal Justice: the Warren Court and the
Criminal Cases, 1975 U. ILL. L. F. 518, 518-19; Burkoff, supra note 41, at 152 n.2; Israel,
Criminal Procedure, the Burger Court, and the Legacy of the Warren Court, 75 MICH. L. REV. 1319,
1320 n.1 (1977); Stone, TheMiranda Doctrine in the Burger Court, 1977 Sup. CT. REv. 99, 99 n.2.
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performed by governments, very few have been 'exclusively re-
served to the State."' 4
At least one significant category of nominally private search
and seizure activity appears, however, to meet this test for state
action: the search and seizure activity of the over 1,000,000 indi-
viduals employed as "private police." 9 Such private police are a
part of the
4 Flagg Bros. Inc., v. Brooks, 436 U.S. 149, 158 (1978) (quoting Jackson v. Metropoli-
tan Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345, 352 (1974)). See also White v. Scrivner Corp., 594 F.2d 140,
142 (5th Cir. 1979).
95 In this Article, "private police" includes "all privately employed guards, investigators,
patrolmen, alarm and armored-transport personnel, and any other personnel performing
similar functions." J. KAKALIK & S. WILDHO.N, supra note 62, at 3 n.1. See also P. MANNING,
POLICE WORK: THE SOCIAL ORGANIZATION OF POLICING 40 (1977); NATIONAL ADVISORY
COMMITTEE ON CRIMINAL JUSTICE STANDARDS AND GOALS, PRIVATE SECURITY: REPORT OF
THE TASK FORCE ON PRIVATE SECURITY 3, 10-11 (1976) [hereinafter referred to as TASK
FORCE ON PRIVATE SECURITY].
The number and significance of private security personnel is extraordinary:
There are more than 1 million people involved in private security in the United
States. The private security industry is a multibillion-dollar-a-year business that
grows at a rate of 10 to 12 percent per year. In many large cities, the number
of private security personnel is considerably greater than the number of police
and law enforcement personnel. Of those individuals involved in private secur-
ity, some are uniformed, some are not; some carry guns, some are unarmed;
some guard nuclear energy installations, some guard golf courses; some are
trained, some are not; some have college degrees, some are virtually unedu-
cated.
There is virtually no aspect of society that is not in one way or another
affected by private security. A business may employ guards to protect persons
and property from damage, injury or loss. Special security services are obviously
required in places of public accommodation, such as airports, schools, and
commercial complexes. The pervasive involvement of private security plays a
vital role in efforts to create a safe environment in which to work and live.
TASK FORCE ON PRIVATE SECURITY, supra, at Foreward (emphasis added).
Though little is known about it, there ... is a sizable private police industry
in the United States .... Private agencies are of two types: (1) purchased or
contract private security services, and (2) in-house or proprietary police security
services .... About one in every 100 persons in the civilian labor force of the
United States is employed in public or private law-enforcement or security
work. In 1969 there were an estimated 804,900 persons employed in law en-
forcement or security work .... Of these, 64 percent were employees of public
organizations, 49 percent employed as policemen or investigators, and 15 per-
cent as guards and watchmen. The remaining 36 percent were in the private
sector. In 1969, between one-fourth and one-third of all privately employed
guards and investigators worked for contract security firms and the remainder
were in-house employees.
Reiss, Discretionary Justice, in HANDBOOK OF CRIMINOLOGY 679, 681 (D. Glaser ed. 1974)
(citations omitted). See also People v. Zelinski, 24 Cal. 3d 357, 366-67, 594 P.2d 1000,
1005-06, 155 Cal. Rptr. 575, 580-81 (1979); Halt! A Job Market in Security, New York
Times, Sept. 21, 1980, at F21, col. 2; R. POST &A. KINGSBURY, SECURITY ADMINISTRATION:
AN INTRODUCTION 35-36 (3d ed. 1977); M. C. BASSIOUNI, CITIZEN'S ARREST 3 (1977); M.
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variety of forces found in most complex societies that share
with the formally constituted police the right to use violence:
security guards, private detectives, reserve constables, and the
like (usually loosely controlled by the full-time police force), re-
gardless of their relationship to the law as a resource for
rationalization of their actions.9
Justices Stevens, White, and Marshall recently observed in dissent
in Flagg Brothers, Inc. v. Brooks: 97
[In determining "exclusivity" for state action purposes, t]he
question is whether a particular action is a uniquely sovereign
function, not whether state law forecloses any possibility of re-
covering for damages for such activity. For instance, it is clear
that the maintenance of a police force is a unique sovereign function,
and the delegation of police power to a private party will entail state
action."
The sole authority cited for the proposition that private exer-
cise of police powers involves state action was the Supreme
Court's decision in Griffin v. Maryland.99 In Griffin, five blacks
were arrested for trespassing after they had refused to leave an
amusement park at the command of a "special policeman" named
Collins. l°° Collins, hired by arrangement with a private detective
agency, acted under direct orders of the park management. 0' The
Court found it beyond dispute "that if the State of Maryland had
operated the amusement park on behalf of the owner thereof,
and had enforced the owner's policy of racial segregation against
[the defendants, they] would have been deprived of the equal
protection of the laws." 102 The Griffin Court reversed the convic-
tions because Collins had acted under state authority. 0 3
Subsequent analysis of Griffin reveals why the Court found
state action. The five-Justice majority of the Supreme Court in
Flagg Brothers pointed out that the Griffin Court "specifically
found that [Collins] 'purported to exercise the authority of a dep-
LIPSON, ON GUARD: THE BUSINESS OF PRIVATE SECURITY 6-7 (1975); Creeping Capitalism,
Forbes, Sept. 1, 1970, at 22.
9 P. MANNING, supra note 95, at 40.
436 U.S. 149 (1978) (involving question whether or not a warehouseman's proposed
sale of goods entrusted to him for storage under New York statutes was state action).
8 Id. at 172 n.8 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (emphasis added).
378 U.S. 130 (1964).
'00 Id. at 132.
101 Id.
102 id. at 135-36.
I's Id. at 135. See text accompanying note 105 infra.
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uty sheriff.' "104 The Griffin Court had reasoned that "[i]f an
individual is possessed of state authority and purports to act
under that authority, his action is state action. It is irrelevant that
he might have taken the same action had he acted in a purely
private capacity.... Thus, it is clear that Collins' action was state
action." 10 Because Collins had not acted in a private capacity,
the Flagg Brothers majority concluded that, "[c]ontrary to Mr. Jus-
tice Stevens' suggestion, . .. this Court has never considered the
private exercise of traditional police functions." 106 Accordingly,
in the absence of what the Flagg Brothers majority deemed to be
binding precedent, the Court, in dictum, concluded that the ex-
tent to which police functions undertaken by private parties could
be viewed as subject to constitutional restrictions under the public-
function strand of the state action doctrine was an open
question."7
The Flagg Brothers majority, however, may have been a bit
too facile in concluding that "Griffin ... sheds no light on the
constitutional status of private police forces." 108 It is true that in
Griffin, at the request of the amusement park, the "special police-
man" Collins had been deputized as a sheriff of Montgomery
County, Maryland. But the deputization was entirely pro forma.
Under then applicable Maryland law, as explicitly recognized by
the Griffin Court, any individual could be "deputized" in order to
police private property.10 9
I" Flagg Bros., Inc. v. Brooks, 436 U.S. 149, 163 n.14 (1978) (quoting Griffin v. Mary-
land, 378 U.S. 130, 135 (1964)).
105 378 U.S. 130, 135 (1964) (citation omitted).
'0 Flagg Bros., Inc. v. Brooks, 436 U.S. 149, 163 n. 14 (1978). The Court then stated
that "Griffin thus sheds no light on the constitutional status of private police forces, and we
express no opinion here." Id. at 163-64 n.14.
117 See note 106 supra. More broadly, the Flagg Brothers majority continued, "We express
no view as to the extent, if any, to which a city or State might be free to delegate to private
parties the performance of such functions [as education, fire and police protection, and tax
collection] and thereby avoid the strictures of the Fourteenth Amendment." Id. at 163-64.
See also Griffin v. Maryland, 378 U.S. 130, 137-38 (1964) (Clark, J., concurring). On the
other hand, somewhat inconsistently, the Flagg Brothers majority also declared that:
[We would be remiss if we did not note that there are a number of state and
municipal functions ... which have been administered with a greater degree of
exclusivity by States and municipalities than has the function of so-called "dis-
pute resolution." Among these are such functions as education, fire and police
protection, and tax collection.
436 U.S. at 163 (footnote omitted). See Comment, The State Action Conundrum Reexamined: A
New Approach and Its Application to the Constitutionality of Creditor Self-Help Remedies, 62 MARQ.
L. Rxv. 414, 416 n.15 (1979).
108 436 U.S. at 163-64 n.14.
'0 Collins was deputized at the request of the park management pursuant to § 2-91 of
the Montgomery Code of 1955 which provides that the sheriff
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The Flagg Brothers majority's suggestion that Griffin estab-
lished that deputization of this sort creates state action " 0 reveals a
great deal about the constitutional status of private police forces.
Many private police and security guards perform their policing
duties either as "special deputies" or under statutory authority
that delegates to them police powers within their areas of private
employment."' Contrary to the majority view," 2 the argument in
Justice Stevens' Flagg Brothers dissent-that the Griffin decision
established that "the maintenance of a police force is a unique
sovereign function, and the delegation of police power to a pri-
vate party will entail state action" "-seems justified on the basis
of the Griffin facts. So long as the delegation of police power is as
express as that in Griffin, the actions of private police should be
considered state action under the views of both the Flagg Brothers
majority and the dissent." 4
[o]n application of any corporation or individual, may appoint special deputy
sheriffs for duty in connection with the property of... such corporation or
individual; such special deputy sheriffs to be paid wholly by the corporation or
person on whose account their appointments are made. Such special deputy
sheriffs ... shall have the same power and authority as deputy sheriffs possess
within the area to which they are appointed and in no other area.
378 U.S. at 132 n.1 (quoting Griffin v. State, 225 Md. 422, 430, 171 A.2d 717, 721 (1961)).
"0 See text accompanying notes 104-07 supra. See also Williams v. United States, 341 U.S.
97 (1951); El Fundi v. Deroche, 625 F.2d 195 (8th Cir. 1980); Pratt v. State, 9 Md. App.
220, 263 A.2d 247 (1970); People v. Eastway, 67 Mich. App. 464, 467, 241 N.W.2d 249,
250 (1976); People v. Diaz, 85 Misc. 2d 41, 43-44, 376 N.Y.S.2d 849, 851-52 (Crim. Ct.
1975); People v. Smith, 82 Misc. 2d 204, 205-08, 368 N.Y.S.2d 954, 955-58 (Crim. Ct.
1975); People v. Bowers, 77 Misc. 2d 697, 698-99, 356 N.Y.S.2d 432, 434-35 (App. Term
1974); Note, Pivate Assumption of the Police Function Under the Fourth Amendment, 51 B.U. L.
REV. 464, 474-75 (1971). Cf. United States v. Fannon, 556 F.2d 961, 964 (9th Cir. 1977)
(searches by airline employees of packages subject to fourth amendment limitations since
air carrier authorized by federal statute to conduct searches), rev'd. sub. noam. United States
v. Gumerlock, 590 F.2d 794 (9th Cir. 1979) (en banc), cert. denied, 441 U.S. 948 (1979). But
see White v. Scrivner Corp., 594 F.2d 140, 143 (5th Cir. 1979) (store employee's detention
of suspect held not a public function); Weyandt v. Mason's Stores, Inc., 279 F. Supp. 283
(W.D. Pa. 1968) (state shoplifting statute authorizing detention of suspect and evidence of
licensing of private detectives under state statute insufficient to constitute state action).
"' Private policing statutory arrangements, although highly idiosyncratic, are very
common. e TASK FORCE ON PRIVATE SECURITY, supra note 95, at 10; J. KAKALIK &
S. WILDHORN, supra note 62, at 151-72, 207; R. PosT & A. KINGSBURY, supra note 95, at
130-32; Comment, supra note 62, at 557-60 (1971).
112 See text accompanying notes 106-08 supra.
"1 436 U.S. at 172 n.8.
114 [T]he proposition that the state has delegated a sovereign function is easily
transmuted into the proposition that the legislation, by its delegation of power,
has transformed a private party into an agent of the state. That is ultimately
what Justice Rehnquist [for the majority in Flagg Brothers] treated the [state
action] challenge as meaning.
L. TRIBE, supra note 91, at 108-09. See also Williams v. United States, 341 U.S. 97 (1951);
DeCarlo v. Joseph Home & Co., 251 F. Supp. 935 (W.D. Pa. 1966).
CORNELL LAW REVIEW
This proposition, which emerges so clearly from Flagg
Brothers, seems to elude many lower courts. For example, in State
v. McDaniel,"' the Ohio Court of Appeals concluded that private
security guards employed by a large department store chain were
not subject to constitutional restrictions when they spied on cus-
tomers trying on clothing even though the court found that the
customers, "while using the [department store] fitting rooms, had
a reasonable expectation of privacy or freedom from
intrusion.... " 116 Despite the fact that most of the security guards
in question had been sworn and commissioned as "special deputy
sheriffs" by the county sheriff in a fashion similar to the guard in
Griffin,"7 the court refused to find state action:
Only [the department store] controls the conduct and activities
of its security employees, whether or not commissioned as spe-
cial deputy sheriffs, and there is no indication herein that the
sheriff exercises any control whatsoever over the activities of
such security employees. They do not perform their duties for
the benefit of the public but rather, for the benefit of [the
store]."8
On the basis of the Griffin and Flagg Brothers decisions, McDaniel
was wrongly decided."9 Nonetheless, it has been followed by the
Ohio courts 120 and by appellate courts in other states. 2'
In any case, the Flagg Brothers majority still can be seen as
having left open the significant question of whether private police
" 44 Ohio App. 2d 163, 337 N.E.2d 173 (1975).
116 Id. at 170, 337 N.E.2d at 178.
"1 Id. at 164, 337 N.E.2d at 175.
118 Id. at 175, 337 N.E.2d at 180.
9 In Griffin, the detective Collins also appeared to be acting in his private employment:
"At the time the arrests were made, the park officer had on the uniform of the [detective]
agency, and he testified that he arrested the [defendants] under the established policy of
[the park operator] of not allowing Negroes in the park." Griffin v. State, 225 Md. 422,
426, 171 A.2d 717, 718 (1961), rev'd, 378 U.S. 130 (1964).
"2 See State v. Edwards, 50 Ohio App. 2d 63, 65, 361 N.E.2d 1083, 1085 (1976). See also
State v. Bolan, 27 Ohio St. 2d 15, 271 N.E.2d 839 (1971); City of University Heights v.
Conley, 20 Ohio Misc. 112, 252 N.E.2d 198 (Mun. Ct. 1969). But cf. State v. Glover, 52
Ohio App. 2d 35, 38, 367 N.E.2d 1202, 1204 (1976) (duly commissioned police officer has
right and duty to arrest and detain a shoplifter even though acting as a private security
guard).
"I See People v. Toliver, 60 Ill. App. 3d 650, 653, 377 N.E.2d 207, 210 (1978); State v.
Gonzales, 24 Wash. App. 437, 440, 604 P.2d 168, 170 (1979). See also United States v.
Lima, 424 A.2d 113 (D.C. Ct. App. 1980) (en banc); People v. Holloway, 82 Mich. App.
629, 632-33, 267 N.W.2d 454, 455-56 (1978); People v. Smith, 31 Mich. App. 366, 373-74,
188 N.W.2d 16, 19-20 (1971); Gillett v. State, 588 S.W.2d 361 (Tex. Crim. App. 1979)
(alternative holding).
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who are not deputized or otherwise operating under state or local
authorization are state actors under the public-function analysis.
A strong argument can be made that their activity also constitutes
state action under the test of "exclusivity" 22 because private polic-
ing activity often involves the exercise of policing functions that
have been traditionally reserved to the states.
Unfortunately, the Supreme Court has offered little guid-
ance as to what constitutes "traditional exclusivity" with respect
to a public function. One noted constitutional scholar has gone so
far as to conclude that under the Court's Flagg Brothers public-
function test it is a "virtual impossibility [to suggest] criteria to
determine what is and what is not [an] inherently governmental
[function]." 125 Justices Stevens, White, and Marshall, dissenting
in Flagg Brothers, argued on narrower grounds that the exclusivity
test was simply inapposite to police functions: "As the [majority] is
forced to recognize, its notion of exclusivity simply cannot be
squared with the wide range of 'functions that are typically consid-
ered sovereign functions, such as " 'education, fire and police pro-
tection, and tax collection." 2 4  In any event, despite confused
assertions to the contrary by the Flagg Brothers majority, 5 prior
Court opinions had recognized that police activities are exclusive
state functions.'26  As recently as 1974, the Supreme Court ex-
plicitly characterized police protection as a "traditional state
monopol[y]." 2 7
Moreover, the Supreme Court had substantial grounds upon
which to base this conclusion. The pervasive presence of public
police authority with an exclusive mandate to enforce all criminal
laws had developed in the United States by the end of the
nineteenth century. 8  One commentator has observed that public
122 See text accompanying notes 92-94 supra.
125 L. TRIBE, supra note 91, at 108 (footnote omitted).
124 Flagg Bros., Inc. v. Brooks, 436 U.S. 149, 173 n.10 (1978) (Stevens, J., dissenting)
(quoting id. at 163). Professor Choper posits a "power theory" analysis in this setting that
might be viewed as reconciling the "exclusivity" approach with the dissenting view, finding
state action present in the activity of "providers of basic services... which our historic and
evolving traditions indicate would be supplied by the public but for the existence of the
private counterpart." Choper, Thoughts on State Action: The "Government Function" and "Power
Theory" Approaches, 1979 WASH. U.L.Q. 757, 778-79.
125 See note 107 supra.
126 See Norwood v. Harrison, 413 U.S. 455, 465 (1973); Lloyd Corp., Ltd. v. Tanner,
407 U.S. 551, 561-62 (1972); Moose Lodge No. 107 v. Irvis, 407 U.S. 163, 173 (1972).
'2 Gilmore v. City of Montgomery, 417 U.S. 556, 574 (1974).
M28 See, e.g., R. FOGELSON, BiG-Crry POLICE 13-17 (1977); M. LIPsON, supra note 95, at 19;
P. MANNING, supra note 95, at 89-102; Comment, Who's Watching the Watchman? The Regula-
tion, or Non-Regulation of America's Largest Law Enforcement Institution, The Private Police, 5
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control over policing activity became accepted as a public necessity
because "[tihe view that the law is the sole legitimator of official
violence ha[d] become conventional wisdom in mass societies and
thus suffuse[d] the ideology of everyday law and order
conceptions." 129 Hence, "It]he exercise of official coercion is
made possible by the legalistic legitimation of the police and by
the backup or support function they can obtain from other agen-
cies within a community." " In contrast, "[t]he vigilante group
represents a symbolic threat because it reduces the power that a
quasi-monopoly on symbols of authority and violence provides the
police,""' and "[t]he proliferation of private security forces is
viewed by some as evidence of fragmentation of the [traditional]
authority of the police ... ," 132
Although the proliferation of private police activity into areas
traditionally monopolized by the states began in earnest in the
mid-nineteenth century,'33 the most rapid expansion of the private
security industry began after World War II "I and continued to
grow- particularly during the last decade-at an extraordinary
rate. 3  While many explanations have been offered to account
for this growth, one of the more convincing is purely economic:
GOLDEN GATE L. REv. 433, 443-45 (1975). Private police forces in England, which were
widespread as late as the early nineteenth century, were vastly reduced in size and influ-
ence during the rapid expansion of public police forces in the middle and late nineteenth
century. See, e.g., S. CHAPMAN & T.E. ST. JOHNSTON, THE POLICE HERITAGE IN ENGLAND
AND AMERICA 11-15 (1962); M. LIPSON, supra note 95, at 20; P. MANNING, supra note 95, at
91.
n9 P. MANNING, supra note 95, at 100.
I" Id. at 101.
131 Id. at 367-68 (citation omitted).
112 Id. at 368.
m According to two commentators,
If one takes a standard definition of police functions, e.g ... crime preven-
tion, crime repression, criminal apprehension, and the regulation of non-
criminal behavior and social welfare functions (including traffic control, in-
tervention in domestic squabbles, handling of drunks, etc.), it is clear that pri-
vate police have been heavily involved in the performance of these functions
since, at least, the establishment of the Pinkerton Agency in the 1850s.
Scott & McPherson, The Development of the Private Sector of the Criminal Justice System, 6 LAW
& Soc'Y Rzv. 267, 267 (1971).
B4 See, e.g., M. LIPSON, supra note 95, at 41-59; TASK FORCE ON PRIVATE SECURITY, supra
note 95, at 31-32; J. KAKALIK & S. WILDHORN, supra note 62, at 42-67; Comment, supra
note 128, at 433-34.
135 "tT]he Department of Labor's Bureau of Labor Statistics projects employment of
820,013 private security guards in 1990, well over twice the number ten years ago. That
makes it one of the fastest-growing trades that the bureau tracks." Halt! A Job Market in
Security, supra note 95, at F21, col. 2.
PRIVATE SEARCHES
[C]ommerce and industry, rather than the individual and his
home, [became] the main targets of crime [after World War II].
Those who committed crimes gravitated to the areas where the
pickings were best: the office, the factory, the bank, the rail-
road station, the airport, the stores and other business establish-
ments. So business ... joined in the clamor for more and more
protection by the law enforcement agencies. But because they
could not wait as their profits and capital eroded, they resorted
in increased numbers to self-help-private security.'
The most significant modern delegation of traditional polic-
ing authority to private entities or individuals consists of the legal
privilege to use otherwise unlawful force against others.'37 The
surrender by the State of forcible investigatory and detention
powers, whether by statute or simply as a matter of "state-
enforced custom," "3 is clearly a delegation of traditional sovereign
power. As the Supreme Court stated in 1947:
It is a common practice in this country for private watchmen or
guards to be vested with the powers of policemen, sheriffs or
peace officers to protect the private property of their private
employers. And when they are performing their police functions, they
are acting as public officers and assume all the powers and liabilities
attaching thereto."9
Even if the State has not expressly delegated to private police
any greater legal authority than that theoretically possessed by
ordinary citizens, ' 4 "[a]s a practical matter, . . . because of train-
ing, experience, and position, security personnel have a greater
opportunity to use their citizens' powers." " A recent Rand Cor-
poration study concluded, "private security personnel generally
do not possess powers any greater than those of other private
citizens. As a practical matter, however, they are likely to be able
1-' M. LIPSON, supra note 95, at 52. See also R. PosT & A. KINGSBURY, supra note 95, at
35; Halt! Ajob Market in Security, supra note 95, at F21, col. 2.
"' The Flagg Brothers majority purported to reserve the question of the extent to which
delegation of police powers through "state authorization of private breach of the peace," is
state action. Flagg Bros., Inc. v. Brooks, 436 U.S. 149, 160 n.9 (1978). See also Note, supra
note 110, at 470-73 (1971); J. KAKALIK & S. WILDHORN, supra note 62, at 231-32.
"a See Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 171 (1970).
NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Corp., 331 U.S. 416, 429 (1947) (emphasis added). See
also Williams v. United States, 341 U.S. 97, 99 (1951).
140 See M. BASSIOUNI, supra note 95; Note, The Law of Citizen's Arrest, 65 COLUM. L. REv.
502 (1965).
"' TASK FORCE ON PRIVATE SECURITY, supra note 95, app. VIII, at 391. Private police
employed by retail establishments make approximately 500,000 arrests a year. M. LIPSON,
supra note 95, at 8-9.
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to exercise those powers more easily, especially by gaining tacit
consent from the public." 142 Indeed, it appears that some private
police, as a matter of psychological and tactical advantage, prefer
having only the ordinary citizen's powers of arrest and detention.
As one commentator has observed, "[t]he illusion (or deception) of
having security personnel present whose legal status is not clearly
understood [by those with whom they come in contact] is often
viewed as a [crime] deterrent asset." 4 Because private police can
expect the same obeisance to their show or threat of authority
that is generally accorded public law enforcement authorities
without being subject to the constitutional constraints that apply
to public authorities, "private police are accorded not only the
psychological advantage over those whom they detain ... ,but
advantage under the law as well." "I
Equally important, to the extent that state law enforcement
planning and activity has become intertwined with and, in some
instances, dependent upon the increasingly substantial presence of
individuals and entities engaged in private policing, 45 the public
and the private law enforcement sectors have become mutually
dependent. According to the 1977 Rand Corporation report on
private police:
Cooperative arrangements [between public and private law
enforcement authorities] take many forms. Public police may
provide private police with arrest records; they sometimes oper-
ate a nightly call-in service for security agencies, with patrol
cars being dispatched to check-on those guards who fail to call
in periodically; they may provide retail merchants with bulletins
describing known shoplifters; they may respond to calls for aid;
they sometimes complete investigations begun by private police;
some departments provide private police with radios preset to
the police frequency; some freely exchange information; some
departments permit the installation of direct-dial alarms and/or
central-station alarms which simultaneously notify the police de-
j. KAKALIK & S. WILDHORN, supra note 62, at 208. One significant danger with
assuming that private police activity is not "state action" is that private police need not
demonstrate compliance with constitutional requirements of avoiding coercion in obtaining
waivers of right. See, e.g., Bumper v. North Carolina, 391 U.S. 543 (1968); Note, Consent to
Search in Response to Police Threats to Seek or to Obtain a Search Warrant: Some Alternatives, 71J. CRIM.
L. & GRIM. 163 (1980).
14 R. POST & A. KINGSBURY, supra note 95, at 99. &e also Becker, The Place of Private
Police in Society: An Area of Research for the Social Sciences, 21 Soc. PRoB. 438, 446-47 (1974).
14 Becker, supra note 143, at 449 (footnote omitted). See also Scott & McPherson, supra
note 133, at 284-85; text accompanying notes 62-63 supra.
"' See J. KAKALIK & S. WiLDHOP.N, supra note 62, at 94-97; P. MANNING, supra note 95,
at 368; TASK FORCE ON PRIVATE SECURITY, supra note 95, at 18-22, 204-39.
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partment. Reciprocally, private police often act as extended
eyes and ears of the public police; they occasionally assist in
serving warrants and citations on private property, or in traffic
control around private property; they report suspicious persons
and circumstances to public police; they may make preliminary
investigations; they may make or assist in making arrests; they
may apprise police of impending, unusual situations, such as
strikes, gathering of unruly crowds, and so on. 14 6
The Task Force on Private Security of the National Advisory
Committee on Criminal Justice Standards and Goals recently con-
cluded that, given the pervasiveness of such modern trends as
cooperative crime prevention planning and activity, "it is some-
times difficult to differentiate between the efforts of the public
and private security elements in crime prevention ... 1 .47 Fur-
thermore, the interdependency of private and public security
efforts is not restricted to the prevention of crime.48
' J. KAKALIK & S. WILDHORN, supra note 62, at 94. "As to actual contact with public
police, 7 percent of the private security employees claimed they called local police for
assistance once or twice a week, 14 percent said once or twice a month, 30 percent said
once or twice a year, 15 percent said when necessary, and 27 percent said never." Id. at 95.
"[Bloth public 'policing' and private 'security' are parts of the whole, e.g., public security or
protective services." R. PosT & A. KINGSBURY, supra note 95, at 5. See also Scott & McPher-
son, supra note 133, at 281-85; Post, Relations With Private Police Services, Police Chief 54,
55-56 (Mar. 1971); Creeping Capitalism, Forbes, Sept. 1, 1970, at 22; Becker, supra note 143,
at 439-41.
Other forms of private and public police interaction are common. For example:
There are numerous instances in which police officers, still active in their own
departments, are open or silent partners or owners of private contract security
agencies. While they may be involved in this moonlighting activity on their own
off-duty time only, the knowledge of their interest by a customer or potential
customer could lead to the belief that special sworn police attention would be
paid to any premises the moonlighter's firm protects .... There are many
more examples of sworn police officers moonlighting as private security guards,
sometimes even in official sworn police uniform, wearing an official badge, and
carrying an official gun. The presence of these trained men undoubtedly in-
creases the security of the guarded business, but it also connotes conflict of
interest ....
M. LipsoN, supra note 95, at 179. See also TASK FORCE ON PRIVATE SECURITY, supra note 95, at
231-39.
Anecdotal evidence is also revealing. It was reported in 1967 that the Governor of Flor-
ida was "instrumental in organizing a privately financed war on crime through the use of
... a private detective agency." Comment, Regulation of Private Police, 40 So. CAL. L. REv.
540 n.6 (1967) (citing L.A. Times, Feb. 12, 1967, § 1, at 1, col. 4); id., Feb. 19, 1967, § G,
at 3, col. 5; id., Mar. 23, 1967, § II, at 4, col. 1. See also Private Unit to Patrol in Downtown
Kansas City, N.Y. Times, Nov. 11, 1980, § A, at 12, col. 6.
147 TASK FORCE ON PRIVATE SECURITY, supra note 95, at 6. See also id. at 18-22, 204-39;
Becker, supra note 143, at 443.
'"" Although the private security industry interacts most frequently with the
public law enforcement component of the criminal justice system, it also in-
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This functional interrelatedness figures significantly in the
public-function analysis. Where private and public activities are
demonstrably interdependent, the Supreme Court has concluded
that the private actor "must be recognized as a joint participant
[with the state] in ... challenged activity, which, on that account,
cannot be considered to have been so 'purely private' as to fall
without the scope of the [Constitution]." 49 Although the Burger
Court has signalled its reluctance to expand this proposition
beyond so-called "symbiotic relationships," 150 the "facts and cir-
cumstances" at issue '-including state delegation of sovereign
authority to commit breaches of the peace 152 and massive inter-
dependent relationships-are compelling. Indeed, in adopting
this state action analysis, the Supreme Court of California noted
"the increasing reliance placed upon private security personnel by
local law enforcement authorities for the prevention of crime and
teracts with other components. For example, when a shoplifter is observed
committing the act by private security personnel of a retail establishment, secur-
ity personnel may apprehend and detain the person until the police take for-
mal custody. For purposes of prosecution and formal arraignment on charges
of larceny, the store security agent becomes the complainant. The chief accuser
and witness in a court of law also is the security person who observed the
shoplifting incident.
Private security investigative personnel often work closely with investigators
from law enforcement agencies and prosecutors' offices in investigating internal
theft by employees, embezzlement, fraud, and external theft by organized crim-
inal groups. For example, in large retail establishments (dej~artment stores, dis-
count houses), security personnel have an interest in removing organized crim-
inal rings that systematically prey upon the stores. The security personnel can
exchange information among themselves and provide information to law en-
forcement investigators to assist them in the development of criminal cases.
Law enforcement officers frequently provide information to the store security
personnel regarding a suspect under arrest or investigation, who may have
been involved in criminal offenses in their stores. Private security personnel
commonly provide information to law enforcement agencies on criminal activi-
ties they observe or suspect that are not directly related to their assets-
protection function, such as narcotics, gambling, and other vice offerles.
TASK FORCE ON PRIVATE SECURITY, supra note 95, at 21.
"' Burton v. Wilmington Parking Auth., 365 U.S. 715, 725 (1961). See also Gilmore v.
City of Montgomery, 417 U.S. 556, 565, 573 (1974); Columbia Broadcasting Sys., Inc. v.
Democratic Nat'l Comm., 412 U.S. 94, 133 n.3 (1973) (Stewart, J.); id. at 172-75 (Brennan,
J., dissenting); Moose Lodge No. 107 v. Irvis, 407 U.S. 163, 172-73 (1972); Evans v. New-
ton, 382 U.S. 296, 299 (1966).
"o See, e.g., Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345, 356-57 (1974). But see id.
at 359-60 (Douglas, J., dissenting); id. at 366 (Marshall, J., dissenting); Sims v. Jefferson
Downs, Inc., 611 F.2d 609, 611 (5th Cir. 1980).
"I' See text accompanying note 89 supra.
'52 See note 137 supra, and notes 161-201 and accompanying text infra. See also United
States v. Davis, 482 F.2d 893 (9th Cir. 1973).
enforcement of the criminal law and the increasing threat to
privacy rights posed thereby." 1
In short, many private actors participating in such "law en-
forcement-like" activity clearly engage in searches and seizures
that should be subject to constitutional principles applicable under
the public-function doctrine.'54 Private police who engage in
illegal searches are "often quasi-public officials or agents, cloaked
with the authority of the state by virtue of their licenses, badges,
uniforms, and other apparatus...." 155 Moreover, as the recent
Flagg Brothers decision demonstrates, the express delegation of
police powers to private police should alone establish state action
for purposes of applying constitutional limits on the exercise of
those powers. Even where no express delegation of policing au-
thority can be found, the exercise by private police of traditional
public policing powers and the interdependency of private and
public police forces dictate that private police should be subject to
the same constitutional limitations that govern public law enforce-
ment authorities.
This conclusion follows not only from an application of
established state action doctrine, but also from highly salutary
public policy goals. One study of private police activity concluded:
[T]o the extent that the private police system in its activities
and methods provides a means by which the public police are
able to bypass, evade, or subvert systems of accountability and
rules of procedure, the unregulated development of a closely
interacting private and public police system will inevitably cre-
ate serious problems. 5'
Unchecked and unlawful behavior of private actors seriously
threatens the constitutionally protected concerns of privacy and
personal autonomy. Because of the lack of judicial scrutiny or le-
gal limitation under existing law, "[a]lmost nothing is kndwn from
"' People v. Zelinski, 24 Cal. 3d 357, 366, 594 P.2d 1000, 1005, 155 Cal. Rptr. 575, 580
(1979). See also In re Deborah C., 111 Cal. App. 3d 289, 168 Cal. Rptr. 556 (1980); In re
Bryan S., 110 Cal. App. 3d 144, 167 Cal. Rptr. 741 (1980); Cervantez v. J.C. Penney Co.,
Inc. 24 Cal. 3d 579, 588-89, 595 P.2d 975, 979-80, 156 Cal. Rptr. 198, 203 (1979). But see
People v. Sapper, 102 Cal. App. 3d 301, 162 Cal. Rptr. 360 (1980).
'" See Note, Private Assumption of the Police Function Under the Fourth Amendment, supra
note 110, at 474 ("In a constitutional sense, the police function is a public function."); J.
KAALiK & S. WiLmHoRN, supra note 62, at 209-15, 231.
'15 J. KAKALIK & S. WILDHORN, supra note 62, at 255.
' Scott & MacPherson, supra note 133, at 284-85. See also id. at 285-88; TASK FORCE ON
PRIVATE SECURITY, supra note 95, at 11; M. BASSIOUNI, supra note 95, at 72-73; Comment,
supra note 62, at 567-71 (1971).
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systematic inquiry about how ... private police exercise discretion
over criminal matters," 5 7 and the public can do little, if anything,
to control unlawful private police activity.
Sanctions are rarely invoked.... [C]urrent tort, criminal, and
constitutional law is not adequate-substantively or
procedurally-to control certain problem areas involving pri-
vate security activities, such as searches, arrests, use of firearms,
and investigations. Nor has current law always provided adequ-
ate remedy for persons injured by actions of private security
personnel. 151
Constitutional doctrine simply has not kept pace with the rapid
expansion in numbers and authority of private police. Existing
laws and doctrinal analyses "stem from a time when there was no
large private security industry." "I The time is nigh to reevaluate
the legal status of the relationship between public and private law
enforcement and to subject the latter to the same constitutional
restrictions that currently apply to the former . 6°
B. State Authorization or Encouragement
State action can also be found when the State has either "au-
thorized" or "encouraged" private conduct.' 61  As with the public-
function test, however, the Supreme Court has recently been
somewhat less than consistent, coherent, or enthusiastic in its ex-
plication of this aspect of state action doctrine. As a result, cases
in this area have become a popular target of scholarly criticism.
Professor Charles Black acidly observed that "It]he field is a con-
ceptual disaster area." 162 More recently, two commentators con-
' Reiss, supra note 95, at 681. "Existence of .-.. a private [police] profession without
effective controls by society over its actions ... creates a danger of abuse to which little
attention has been given." J. KAKAL1K & S. WLDHORN, supra note 62, at 209. See also Peo-
ple v. Zelinski, 24 Cal. 3d 357, 366, 594 P.2d 1000, 1005, 155 Cal. Rptr. 575, 580 (1979).
"' j. KAKALiK & S. WILDHORN, supra note 62, at 6; Note, Seizures by Private Parties: Exclu-
sion in Criminal Cases, 19 STAN. L. REv. 608, 615-16 (1967); 1966 UTAH L. Rxv. 271, 275-
76.
159 J. KAALiK & S. Wlt-nHOR1t, supra note 62, at 209.
160 "[Uintil the Court ... directly confronts the idea that private power is indeed re-
sponsible for the effects it has on individual rights, its contributions to the creation of
norms in th[e state action] area will remain at a standstill." Nerken, A New Deal for the
Protection of Fourteenth Amendment Rights: Challenging the Doctrinal Bases of The Civil Rights Cases
and State Action Theory, 12 HARv. C.R. C.L. L. REv. 297, 363 (1977).
61 See, e.g., Flagg Brothers, Inc. v. Brooks, 436 U.S. 149, 164 (1978); Reitman v. Mul-
key, 387 U.S. 369, 375-76 (1967).
162 Black, the Supreme Court, 1966 Term: "State Action," Equal Protection, and California's
Proposition 14, 81 HARV. L. REv. 69, 95 (1967).
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cluded that "[a]lthough several tests for finding state action have
emerged from Supreme Court decisions, none is adequate to pre-
dict whether state action will be found in a new case." 163 Profes-
sor Laurence Tribe's observation is hardly more charitable:
"Those who simply criticize the Court's attempts are ... both cor-
rect and irrelevant. Plainly, the state action decisions fail as doc-
trine; the question is, do they make sense as anything else?" '6
The Warren Court interpreted and applied the authorization
or encouragement principle rather broadly, particularly in race
discrimination cases.' 6  The Burger Court, on the other hand,
has narrowed its application, often with revisionist zeal. For exam-
ple, in Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison Co.,' 66 the Burger Court re-
fused to find state action based on authorization or encourage-
ment even though the Court conceded that the private party in
question had acted pursuant to "extensive state regulation." 167
The Jackson Court concluded that the particular "initiative [in
acting under the regulation] comes from [the private party] and
not from the State," 16 and "there is no suggestion in th[e] record
that [the state] intended either overtly or covertly to encourage the
practice." 169  Disregarding the overriding question of whether the
"1 Glennon & Nowak, A Functional Analysis of the Fourteenth Amendment "State Action" Re-
quirement, 1976 Sup. CT. REv. 221 (footnote omitted). See also The Supreme Court, 1977 Term,
92 HARv. L. REv. 57, 125-27 (1978); Thompson, Piercing the Veil of State Action: The Re-
visionist Theory and a Mythical Application to Self-Help Repossession, 1977 Wisc. L. REv. 1, 9.
'6 L.TmBE, supra note 92, at 1157.
' See, e.g, Reitman v. Mulkey, 387 U.S. 369 (1967); Burton v. Wilmington Parking
Auth., 365 U.S. 715 (1961). See also Black, supra note 162, at 84-91. Professor Black pro-
posed a "realistic" analysis of Warren Court state action cases involving race discrimination:
The "state action" concept in the [race discrimination] field ... has just one
practical function; if and where it works, it immunizes racist practices from
constitutional control. Those who desire to practice racism are therefore moti-
vated, even driven, to test it through total possibility; the metaphor of Proteus
is exact .... The commitment of the Court to a single and exclusive theory of
state action, or to just five such theories, with nicely marked limits for each,
would be altogether unprincipled, in terms of the most vital principle of all -
the reality principle. It would fail to correspond to the endless variations not
only of reality as presently given, but of reality as it may be manipulated and
formed in the hands of people ruled by what seems to be one of the most
tenacious motives in American life.
Id. at 90-91.
419 U.S. 345 (1974).
167 Id. at 350.
161 Id. at 357 (footnote omitted).
169 Id. n.17 (emphasis added). The Court also relied on the district court's conclusion
that "[n]o state official participated in the practice complained of, nor is it alleged that the
state requested or co-operated in the [challenged activity]." Id. at 356 n.15 (quoting 348 F.
Supp. 954, 958 (M.D. Pa. 1972)). See also Moose Lodge No. 107 v. Irvis, 407 U.S. 163 (1972).
(1972).
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Court applied the doctrine correctly, one might have questioned
the latter point directly on the grounds that the subjective intent
of the State should be irrelevant to the objective constitutional
issue of authorization or encouragement for state action
purposes." To no avail, however. In 1978, a bare majority of
the Supreme Court in Flagg Brothers, Inc. v. Brooks 17 continued its
restrictive application of the authorization or encouragement test
by concluding that some measure of state "compulsion"-as con-
trasted with mere "acquiescence"- was a prerequisite to a finding
of state action under this approach. 7 2
Neither the Jackson nor the Flagg Brothers decision indicates
that the Court will become more willing to find state action in
new settings, whatever doctrine guides the inquiry. Despite these
recent crabbed constructions of the authorization or encourage-
ment mode of state action, however, the Burger Court has re-
peatedly reaffirmed the holding and, at least by implication, the
analysis in its pathbreaking state action decision, Shelley v.
Kraemer.'" Shelley's reasoning is not only directly apposite to the
private search question, but it can be reconciled-if a bit uncom-
fortably in a result-oriented sense-with these recent Burger
Court decisions.
In Shelley, the Court unanimously 174 held that judicial en-
forcement of private restrictive covenants "which ha[d] as their
purpose the exclusion of persons of designated race or color from
170 Cf. Scott v. United States, 436 U.S. 128, 136 (1978) (footnote omitted) (for purposes
of evaluating governmental compliance with Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act
of 1968, "[s]ubjective intent alone ... does not make otherwise lawful conduct illegal or
unconstitutional"). See also Burkoff, supra note 41, at 181-90; W. LAFAVE, supra note 7, at
3-18 (1981 Supp.).
171 436 U.S. 149 (1978).
172 Id. at 164-66. But see id. at 170-71 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (footnote omitted):
There is no great chasm between "permission" and "compulsion" requiring par-
ticular state action to fall within one or the other definitional camp. Even Moose
Lodge No. 107 v. Irvis, 407 U.S. 163 [1972], upon which the Court relies for its
distinction between "permission" and "compulsion," recognizes that there are
many intervening levels of state involvement in private conduct that may sup-
port a finding of state action.
See also Dieffenbach v. Attorney Gen., 604 F.2d 187, 194 n.12 (2d Cir. 1979).
1 7 334 U.S. 1 (1948). See, e.g., Abood v. Detroit Bd. of Educ., 431 U.S. 209, 219 n.12
(1976); Watson v. Kenlick Coal Co., Inc., 422 U.S. 1012, 1017 (1975) (cert. denial) (Doug-
las, J., dissenting); Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345, 349 (1974); id. at
361-62 (Douglas, J., dissenting); Moose Lodge No. 107 v. Irvis, 407 U.S. 163, 172 (1972);
Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 169 (1970). See also Tushnet, Book Review, 78
MICH. L. REv. 694, 698-99 (1980).
174 Justices Reed, Jackson, and Rutledge did not participate in the consideration or deci-
sion of Shelley.
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the ownership or occupancy of real property" 175 was uncon-
stitutional state action. Although the Court observed that private
parties possess full freedom to engage in private contracting and
bargaining, "[p]articipation of the State consist[ed] in the en-
forcement of the restrictions so defined." 176 Judicial enforcement
became unconstitutional state action because "the States ... made
available to [private] individuals the full coercive power of
government" 1 in enforcing these discriminatory covenants. The
Court noted that such covenants would have been clearly uncon-
stitutional under the fourteenth amendment if state officials had
been parties to them. 7 8 In short, the Court found state action
because "[t]he judicial action ... bears the clear and unmistakable
imprimatur of the State." 179
The Shelley case is noteworthy, at least in the revisionist light
of recent Burger Court decisions, because the State's "authoriza-
tion or encouragement" -its "compulsion" in 1970s' doctrinal
parlance- consisted entirely of its making available to private par-
ties "the full coercive power of government." "I Such an
approach is clearly an appropriate response to the problem posed
in distinguishing private and public action. As Professor Bruce
Ackerman has recently commented, "we live in a world in which
the powers of government are routinely called upon to enforce
(as well as define) ... 'private' entitlements. Without this rein-
forcement, there is no reason to think that those presently advan-
taged by the distribution of 'private' rights would remain so." 181
Court enforcement of private actions that would be unconstitu-
tional if entered into by governmental actors surely belies any
claim that the State's role can be viewed as one of merely "neu-
tral" judicial activity.'82
This conclusion can be reconciled with Flagg Brothers. As the
Seventh Circuit concluded, the Flagg Brothers majority did not ex-
pressly require a showing of compulsion "when the state activity
might be characterized as an affirmative act rather than mere
'inaction."' I8l Indeed, the Flagg Brothers Court explicitly observed
17- Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1, 4 (1948).
176 Id. at 13.
17 Id. at 19.
318 Id. at 11-12.
179 Id. at 20.
180 Id. at 19.
181 B. ACKERMAN, SOCIAL JUSTICE IN THE LIBERAL-STATE 19 (1980).
182 See also Reitman v. Mulkey, 387 U.S. 369 (1967).
'18 Musso v. Suriano, 586 F.2d 59, 62 n.5 (7th Cir. 1978).
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that the "crux of [the] complaint [in the case] is not that the State
has acted, but that it has refused to act." 184
The applicability of this doctrinal approach to private searches
is manifest. To the extent that the State makes available to private
actors "the full coercive power of government" by affirmatively
acting to prosecute individuals on the basis of evidence seized in
activity that would be unconstitutional if undertaken by gov-
ernmental officials, the State's action cannot be seen as neutral.
Rather, the State must be viewed as a principal or accomplice in
such unlawful private activity.8 ' Indeed, the State's use of the
fruits of a private search might itself constitute in some circum-
stances a "seizure" by the State cognizable under the fourth
amendment. 186 Moreover, such judicial enforcement not only cre-
ates "state action" in the doctrinal sense, it also leads to the tacit
encouragement and ratification of private citizens' unlawful
conduct, 187 which is neither a neutral nor a salutary position for the
State to take. 8
Flagg Bros., Inc. v. Brooks, 436 U.S. 149, 166 (1978) (emphasis in original).
' See text accompanying notes 69-77 supra; People v. Zelinski, 24 Cal. 3d 357, 367-68,
594 P.2d 1000, 1006, 155 Cal. Rptr. 575, 581 (1979). See also M. BASSIOUNI, supra note 95,
at 71; Note, Airport Security Searches and the Fourth Amendment, 71 COLUM. L. REv. 1039,
1044-45 (1971); Comment, Search and Seizure by Private Parties: An Exception to the Exclusion-
aty Rule, 5 LAND & WATER L. REV. 653, 659-60 (1970); Note, supra note 62, at 1356-58. But
see W. LAFAvE, supra note 7, at 138-39.
Professor Choper has aptly criticized arguments for an exaggerated extension of Shelley
based on the conclusion that "[o]nce the state courts are brought in, there is state action."
Choper, supra note 124, at 761. The State in the private search setting, however, is not
acting simply to "[enforce] a private common-law or statutory right," id., but is bringing its
own action in the courts based upon the product of a private breach of the law. See notes
202-08 and accompanying text infra. Neither criminal nor civil prosecution of lawbreakers
detained by private citizens is, of course, mandatory under any state law. As in Shelley,
however, it is not the existence per se of "unconstitutional" private acts that creates state
action; rather, it is the state's act of enforcing private actions that serves as ratification
of-or complicity in-those actions. 334 U.S. at 13-14.
"i United States v. Sanders, 592 F.2d 788, 800-02 (5th Cir. 1979) (Wisdom, J., dissent-
ing), rev'd sub nom. Walter v. United States, 447 U.S. 649 (1980). The Supreme Court has
reserved judgment on this question. Compare United States v. Kelly, 529 F.2d 1365, 1371-
72 (8th Cir. 1976), with United States v. Sherwin, 539 F.2d 1, 7-8 (9th Cir. 1976) (en banc).
See also United States v. Small, 297 F. Supp. 582, 585 n.2 (D. Mass. 1969). As one commen-
tator has noted:
Finding a seizure in the government's acceptance of the fruits of a private
search permits scrutiny of the privacy interests of absent third parties and,
where relevant, directs attention to first amendment rights at stake. It also sig-
nificantly restricts the scope of the Burdeau exemption [from the exclusionary
rule of private searches], which has been the subject of much criticism.
90 HARV L. REv. 463, 467 (1976) (footnote omitted).
'87 See text accompanying notes 48-80 supra.
818 See text accompanying notes 72-77 supra.
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The Supreme Court has accepted an argument of this nature
in an analogous factual setting. In Gambino v. United States,18 9 de-
cided in 1927, two New York state troopers made an automobile
search without probable cause that uncovered contraband liquor
possessed in contravention of federal prohibition laws. Because
probable cause is required for such a search under the fourth
amendment, it would clearly have been unconstitutional if it had
been undertaken by federal agents. 190 The New York state police
immediately turned the evidence over to federal authorities for
their use in prosecuting the possessors in federal court. Today,
this scenario would be forbidden under Elkins v. United States,
which declared such silver platter practice unconstitutional. 9' In
1927, however, the silver platter doctrine was still viable-at least
in the view of a majority of the Supreme Court. 92
This state of the law notwithstanding, the Court reversed the
Gambino defendants' convictions for conspiracy to violate the
federal prohibition laws. Although the Court explicitly found that
the state law enforcement authorities had not acted as "agents" of
the federal authorities, 93 it concluded nonetheless that the evi-
dence had been unconstitutionally secured because "the search
and seizure was made solely for the purpose of aiding the United
States in the enforcement of its laws." 19 Justice Brandeis spoke
for a unanimous Court:
The evidence ... secured was the foundation for the prosecu-
tion and supplied the only evidence of guilt. It is true that the
troopers were not shown to have acted under the directions of
the federal officials in making the arrest and seizure. But the
rights guaranteed by the Fourth and Fifth Amendments may
be invaded as effectively by such [implied] cooperation, as by
the state officers' acting under direction of the federal
officials.-'
The Court's reasoning in Gambino 196 applies with equal force
to private searches. The actions of private actors who unlawfully
189 275 U.S. 310 (1927).
,90 Id. at 314.
191 364 U.S. 206 (1960). See notes 34-47 and accompanying text supra.
19 See Byars v. United States, 273 U.S. 28 (1927). See also text accompanying notes 31-32
supra.
10 275 U.S. at 313, 315, 316.
"1 Id. at 317.
19' Id. at 316. See also Casey v. United States, 276 U.S. 413, 423-24 (1928) (Brandeis, J.,
dissenting).
"9 See also Anderson v. United States, 318 U.S. 350, 356 (1943); United States v. Searp,
586 F.2d 1117, 1120 (6th Cir. 1978); United States v. Sherwin, 539 F.2d 1, 6 n.5 (9th Cir.
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seize evidence for the purpose of helping law enforcement author-
ities prosecute defendants should be treated as unconstitutional
state action. 197 Because the Court decided Gambino before extend-
ing the fourth amendment to the states in Wolfv. Colorado,9' Gam-
bino cannot fairly be distinguished from private search cases on
the ground that law enforcement officers, rather than private
citizens, committed the illegal act. In both instances, for purposes
of the state action inquiry, the actors in Gambino committed the
breach at a time when the fourth amendment did not directly
restrict their actions. 99
In sum, many nominally private searches are suffused with
state action under the authorization or encouragement strand of
the state action doctrine. As one state appellate court has ex-
plained, Gambino teaches that
whenever one who is not an official has engaged in [an] illegal
seizure, not in pursuance of some other interest but solely for
the purpose of law enforcement, he becomes, in effect, an
agent for the government which cannot avail itself of the fruits
of his acts without assuming the responsibility for them .2 0
1976) (en banc); NLRB v. South Bay Daily Breeze, 415 F.2d 360, 363 (9th Cir. 1969);
Knoll Assocs., Inc. v. FTC, 397 F.2d 530, 533-34 (7th Cir. 1968); Corngold v. United
States, 367 F.2d 1, 5 (9th Cir. 1966). But see United States v. Gumerlock, 590 F.2d 794, 800
n.19 (9th Cir.) (en banc), cert. denied, 441 U.S. 948 (1979).
19 See People v. Zelinski, 24 Cal. 3d 357, 366, 594 P.2d 1000, 1005, 155 Cal. Rptr. 575,
580 (1979); Commonwealth v. Eshelman, 477 Pa. 93, 101-02, 383 A.2d 838, 842 (1978);
Note, Private Assumption of the Police Function Under the Fourth Amendment, supra note 110, at
467-68; Comment, State Action After Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison Co.: Analytical
Framework for a Restrictive Doctrine, 81 DIcK. L. Rnv. 315, 332-33 (1977). See also note 191
supra.
19s 338 U.S. 25 (1949).
199 "[The status of a state policeman [in Gambino] with regard to the federal government
was for Fourth Amendment purposes essentially that of a private citizen ... " Common-
wealth v. Eshelman, 477 Pa. 93, 99, 383 A.2d 838, 841 (1978). See text accompanying notes
29-32 supra. See also Black, Burdeau v. McDowell-A Judicial Milepost on the Road to Absolutism,
12 B.U. L. Rxv. 32, 36 (1932). But see United States v. Sherwin, 539 F.2d 1, 6 n.5 (9th Cir.
1976) (en banc).
200 State v. Anonymous, 34 Conn. Supp. 104, 379 A.2d 946, 947 (1978). See also Watson
v. Kenlick Coal Co., 422 U.S. 1012, 1017-18 (1975) (cert. denial) (Douglas, J., dissenting);
Bivens v. Six Unknown Fed. Narcotics Agents, 403 U.S. 388, 392-93 (1971); Knoll Assocs.,
Inc. v. FTC, 397 F.2d 530, 535-36 (7th Cir. 1968); Corngold v. United States, 367 F.2d 1,
8 (9th Cir. 1966); United States v. Krell, 388 F. Supp. 1372, 1374 (D. Alaska 1975); People
v. Zelinski, 24 Cal. 3d 357, 366, 594 P.2d 1000, 1005-06, 155 Cal. Rptr. 575, 580 (1979);
Commonwealth v. Eshelman, 477 Pa. 93, 102, 383 A.2d 838, 842 (1978). But see United
States v. Mekjian, 505 F.2d 1320, 1327 (5th Cir. 1975); United States v. Newton, 510 F.2d
1149, 1153 (7th Cir. 1975); In re Bryan S., 110 Cal. App. 3d 144, 167 Cal. Rptr. 741
(1980); Gasaway v. State, 137 Ga. App. 653, 655-56, 224 S.E.2d 772, 774 (1976); W.
LAFAvE, supra note 7, at 136-37.
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The California Supreme Court, sitting en banc, expressed a similar
view: "Searches and seizures to assist criminal prosecutions may
be such an inherently governmental task as to fall under the
rationale of Marsh v. Alabama.... The application of the exclu-
sionary rule to such 'private' searches is more likely to deter un-
lawful searches than it would in other cases." 20,
When the State uses evidence in its criminal justice system
that private actors unlawfully acquire, its behavior is hardly neu-
tral. Such private activity is only nominally private and should con-
stitute state action. When a private actor engages in acts that
would be unconstitutional if undertaken by law enforcement
authorities-and when the aim of such activity is potential use of
the State's law enforcement processes-the fruits of such activity
under Gambino, Shelley, and current authorization or encourage-
ment doctrine should be deemed the product of state action and,
therefore, should be subject to application of the exclusionary
rule.
V
STATE ACTION REDUX
One last word on state action. There comes a point in this
setting, after separate and distinct analyses of the cases and doc-
trinal minutiae surrounding both the public function and the au-
thorization or encouragement strands of the state action doctrine,
that the two analyses converge. 2  In Flagg Brothers, Inc. v.
Brooks,20 3 a five-Justice majority of the Supreme Court rejected the
proposition that certain forms of private, commercial, civil dispute
resolution mechanisms were traditionally the exclusive domain of
the State.201 Thus, the Justices concluded that private actors had
assumed no public function, at least for state action purposes.
Under the private search doctrine, however, the fruits of illegal
private searches are introduced and admitted into evidence in the
criminal sanctioning process, an arena which unreservedly remains
201 Stapleton v. Superior Court of Los Angeles County, 70 Cal. 2d 97, 103 n.4, 447 P.2d
967, 971 n.4, 73 Cal. Rptr. 575, 579 n.4 (1969) (citation omitted) (obiter dicta). See also
People v. Zelinski, 24 Cal. 3d 357, 366, 594 P.2d 1000, 1005-06, 155 Cal. Rptr. 575, 580
(1979).
It might less charitably be concluded that ultimately these strands of the state action
doctrine collapse rather than converge. See text accompanying notes 162-64 supra.
203 436 U.S. 149 (1978), discussed at notes 85-160 and accompanying text supra.
2" Id. at 157-64. The Court observed that the procedures at issue were "not a significant
departure from traditional private arrangements." Id. at 162 n.12.
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within the exclusive prerogative of the State. 2°" Hence, even
when the State is not responsible for the procedural defect, the
Supreme Court has held that "[w]hen a State obtains a criminal
conviction through ... a trial [lacking in "the procedural and sub-
stantive safeguards that distinguish our system of justice"], it is
the State that unconstitutionally deprives the defendant of his
liberty." 120
When the State affirmatively accepts illegally seized evidence
in its criminal justice system, thereby authorizing or encouraging
actions by private parties that would be unconstitutional if per-
formed by governmental officials, it ignores reality to then assert
that there is no "sufficiently close nexus between the State and the
challenged action." 207 The State accepts the illegally seized
evidence; the State encourages its use through the lack of deter-
rent disincentives; 20 and the State tries and punishes the criminal
defendant on the basis of the evidence so received. Whichever
strand of the state action doctrine is invoked, many private
searches therefore bear the unmistakable imprimatur of the State.
The question of evidentiary exclusion in this setting should not
turn upon the largely semantic barrier of state action, but on tra-
ditional fourth amendment principles.
VI
THE PRIVATE SEARCH DOCTRINE IN THE STATES
Most federal and state courts that have considered the pri-
vate search doctrine since Elkins have steadfastly refused to permit
an exclusionary remedy to be applied to the fruits of unlawful
private searches. 209  Of course, most of these courts have reached
"o' See, e.g., Cuyler v. Sullivan, 446 U.S. 335, 343 (1980); Lisenba v. California, 314
U.S. 219, 236-37 (1941); Moore v. Dempsey, 261 U.S. 86, 90-91 (1923). See also Tushnet,
supra note 173, at 699.
'o Cuyler v. Sullivan, 446 U.S. 335, 343 (1980) (Court found defendant's conviction
tainted by ineffective assistance of counsel even though not alleged that state officials knew
or should have known of this procedural defect).
Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345, 351 (1974) (citing Moose Lodge
No. 107 v. Irvis, 407 U.S. 163, 176 (1972)). See text accompanying note 90 supra.
See text accompanying notes 67-80 supra.
See, e.g., United States v. Lima, 424 A.2d 113 (D.C. Ct. App. 1980); United States v.
Keuylian, 602 F.2d 1033, 1039-40 (2d Cir. 1979); United States v. Rodriguez, 596 F.2d
169, 172-73 (6th Cir. 1979); United States v. Sanders, 592 F.2d 788, 792 (5th Cir. 1979),
rev'd on other grounds sub nom. Walter v. United States, 447 U.S. 649 (1980); United States
v. Gumerlock, 590 F.2d 794, 800 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 441 U.S. 948 (1979); United States
v. Lamar, 545 F.2d 488, 489-90 (5th Cir. 1977); United States v. Sherwin, 539 F.2d 1, 5-7
(9th Cir. 1976); Honeycutt v. Aetna Ins. Co., 510 F.2d 340, 348-49 (7th Cir.). cert. denied,
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this conclusion simply on the authority of Burdeau and scattered
subsequent references by the Supreme Court to that decision. 210
It is notable, however, that the Supreme Court has not, since
1927, squarely reconsidered the Burdeau doctrine; comments by
Supreme Court Justices on the continuing validity of Burdeau
have all been dicta.21
421 U.S. 1011 (1975); United States v. Issod, 508 F.2d 990, 993-94 (7th Cir. 1974), cert.
denied, 421 U.S. 916 (1975); Barnes v. United States, 373 F.2d 517, 518 (5th Cir. 1967)
(per curiam); United States v. Goldberg, 330 F.2d 30, 35 (3rd Cir.), cert. denied, 377 U.S.
953 (1964); In reJ.M.A. v. State, 542 P.2d 170, 174 (Alaska 1975); People v. Leutkemeyer,
74 II. App. 3d 708, 710-12, 393 N.E.2d 117, 119-21 (1979); People v. Toliver, 60 Ill. App.
3d 650, 653, 377 N.E.2d 207, 210 (1978); State v. Bryant, 325 So. 2d 255, 259 (La. 1976);
Commonwealth v. Storella, 375 N.E.2d 348, 350-52 (Mass. App. 1978); People v. Holloway,
82 Mich. App. 629, 631-32, 267 N.W.2d 454, 455-56 (1978); State v. Keyser, 117 N.H. 45,
46-47, 369 A.2d 224, 225-26 (1977); People v. Cibelli, 94 Misc. 2d 316, 318, 404 N.Y.S.2d
811, 813 (Sup. Ct. 1978); Gillett v. State, 588 S.W.2d 361, 363 (Tex. Grim. App. 1979); State
v. Gonzales, 24 Wash. App. 437, 440, 604 P.2d 168, 170 (1980). See also Annot., 36 A.L.R.3d
553 (1971).
For state court decisions rejecting the private search doctrine based on state constitu-
tions, see notes 217-18 infra.
210 See note 3 supra.
21, For example, in Walter v. United States, 447 U.S. 649 (1980), eight members of the
Court appeared to embrace the proposition that private searches were not subject to consti-
tutional limitations, but the references were all dicta.
The Walter Court considered whether a warrantless FBI screening of allegedly obscene
films, which a private party had turned over to the FBI after receiving them through a
mistaken delivery, was an unconstitutional search and seizure and thus subject to the exclu-
sionary rule. In a plurality opinion finding the screening an unconstitutional search, Justice
Stevens, with whom Justice Stewart concurred, observed: "It has, of course, been settled
since Burdeau v. McDowell ... that a wrongful search or seizure conducted by a private
party does not violate the Fourth Amendment and that such private wrongdoing does not
deprive the government of the right to use evidence that it has acquired lawfully." Id. at
656. Justice White, with whom Justice Brennan concurred, wrote separately but noted that
the Court recognized "in Burdeau v. McDowell ... and Coolidge v. New Hampshire ... that
the Fourth Amendment proscribes only governmental action." Id. at 660 (footnote omit-
ted).
Justice Blackmun, joined by Chief Justice Burger and Justices Powell and Rehnquist,
dissented, prefacing his objections with the observation:
The Court at least preserves the integrity of the rule specifically recognized
long ago in Burdeau v. McDowell .... That rule is to the effect that the Fourth
Amendment proscribes only governmental action, and does not apply to a
search or seizure, even an unreasonable one, effected by a private individual
not acting as an agent of the Government or with the participation or know-
ledge of any governmental official.
Id. at 662.
Since Justice Marshall concurred in the judgment reached without issuing or joining any
written statement, all eight of the Justices who wrote or joined in opinions in Walter
appeared to accept with facility Burdeau's private search doctrine.
Yet, the references to the private search doctrine in Walter were all dicta. The dispositive
question for the four plurality Justices in Walter was strictly the unconstitutional scope and
"intensity" of the subsequent governmental search-the screening of the films by the FBI:
"[P]etitioners possessed a legitimate expectation of privacy in the films, and this expecta-
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Reconsideration of the Burdeau private search doctrine in
light of modern constitutional developments should produce a
different result.2 Moreover, in this age of increasingly indepen-
dent state appellate courts,1 it is quite possible that the impetus
in this matter will not be with the Supreme Court of the United
States.
At least one state already has rejected the private search doc-
trine in construing its own constitution. In State v. Helfrich,21 4 the
Montana Supreme Court held that "the search and seizure provi-
sions of Montana law apply to private individuals as well as law
enforcement officers."21 5  Accordingly, the court concluded,
"[e]vidence obtained through illegal invasions of individual pri-
vacy [by private actors is] not to be admitted into evidence in a court
of law of this State."2 6  The Montana Supreme Court relied on
1972 Montana constitutional provisions on individual privacy and,
searches and seizures.1 7 As the Helfrich court concluded, "We
tion was infringed by the Government's unauthorized screening of them." Id. at 662 (White,
J.). See also id. at 658-59 (Stevens, J.). Indeed, the plurality opinion made it clear
that the Court did not even reach the preliminary question of whether "the delivery of the
films to the FBI by a third party was [or was] not a 'seizure' subject to the warrant require-
ment of the Fourth Amendment." Id. at 652 n.4 (Stevens, J.). See also id. at 660 n.1
(White, J.). In addition, the United States had argued in Walter that Burdeau was inapposite
because "this is not a case where petitioners' private materials 'were stolen [and] [t]he thief,
to further his own ends, delivered them to the law officer of the United States."' Brief for
the United States at 26, Walter v. United States, 447 U.S. 649 (1980) (quoting Burdeau v.
McDowell, 256 U.S. 465, 476 (1921) (Brandeis, J., dissenting)). But see United States v.
Sanders, 592 F.2d 788, 800-02 (5th Cir. 1979) (Wisdom, J., dissenting), rev'd on other
grounds sub nom. Walter v. United States, 447 U.S. 649 (1980). See also text accompanying
notes 75 & 186 supra. Other cases containing dicta on the private search question are
United States v. Janis, 428 U.S. 433, 456 n.31 (1976); Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403
U.S. 443, 487 (1971).
2'12 See notes 48-208 and accompanying text supra.
213 See, e.g., Y. KAMISAR, W. LAFAvE & J. ISRAEL, MODERN CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 47-50
(5th ed. 1980); Brennan, State Constitutions and the Protection of Individual Rights, 90 HARV.
L. REv. 489 (1977); Howard, State Courts and Constitutional Rights in the Day of the Burger
Court, 62 VA. L. REv. 873 (1976).
224 - Mont. , 600 P.2d 816 (1979).
21 Id. at -' 600 P.2d at 819.
226 Id. at -' 600 P.2d at 819.
227 The Montana Constitutional provisions at issue read:
Right of privacy. The right of individual privacy is essential to the well-being of a
free society and shall not be infringed without the showing of a compelling
state interest.
MONT. CONsT. art. II, § 10.
Searches and seizures. The people shall be secure in their persons, papers, homes
and effects from unreasonable searches and seizures. No warrant to search any
place, or seize any person or thing shall issue without describing the place to be
searched or the person or thing to be seized, or without probable cause, sup-
ported by oath or affirmation reduced to writing.
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find the Montana Constitution affords an individual greater, ex-
plicit protection in this instance than is offered ifn the Fourth
Amendment decision of the Burdeau Court." 21 8
While the Heifrich decision itself is clearly distinguishable
from all other decisional precedent outside of Montana on the
basis of its roots in the Montana Constitution, it is significant that
the Montana Supreme Court reached the same result eight years
earlier on the concurrent basis of federal constitutional law. In
State v. Brecht,29 the Montana Supreme Court concluded:
This Court ... would be remiss were it not to recognize
that evidence obtained by [private actors through] the unlawful
or unreasonable invasion of several of the constitutionally pro-
tected rights guaranteed to its citizens by both the federal and
Montana constitutions properly comes within the contemplation
of this Court's exclusionary rule. To do otherwise would lend
Court approval to a fictional distinction between classes of
citizens: those who are bound to respect the Constitution and
those who are not. Were the exclusionary rule to recognize
such distinctions it would by indirection circumvent the rule
established by this Court to enforce these rights and would in
fact render the rule and the constitutional guarantees it pro-
tects meaningless.20
The Brecht court did not mention Burdeau in its opinion. In 1974,
however, the Montana Supreme Court declined to overrule Brecht,
reasoning:
If one considers that any exclusionary process only ex-
cludes "unreasonable" conduct it can readily be seen that all
intrusions are not unreasonable. Like it or not, unreasonable or
illegal intrusions knowingly accepted and used, from the private sec-
tor by the government amount to an extension of the silver
platter doctrine condemned by Elkins, particularly when viewed
in the light of judicial integrity emphasized in Elkins. It has
been argued that Elkins did not disturb Burdeau, it may not
have been clear in the pure Fourth Amendment context, but a
MoNT. CONST. art. II, § 11.
218 Mont. at-., 600 P.2d at 818. There is also a significant trend in state decisions
rejecting the private search doctrine as applied to private security officers. See People v.
Zelinski, 24 Cal. 3d 357, 594 P.2d 1000, 155 Cal. Rptr. 575 (1979); State v. Hutchinson,
349 So. 2d 1252 (La. 1977); People v. Eastway, 67 Mich. App. 464, 241 N.W.2d 249, 250
(1976) (dicta); People v. Diaz, 85 Misc. 2d 41, 376 N.Y.S.2d 849, 851-52 (Grim. Ct. 1975);
People v. Smith, 82 Misc. 2d 204, 368 N.Y.S.2d 954, 955-58 (Grim. Ct. 1975); People v.
Bowers, 77 Misc. 2d 697, 356 N.Y.S.2d 432 (App. Term 1974).
219 157 Mont. 264, 485 P.2d 47 (1971).
22 Id. at 271, 485 P.2d 51.
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close examination does move one to believe that the silver plat-
ter concept was condemned in any context.
2
1
In short, the Montana Supreme Court has concluded that
federal constitutional law involving the right to privacy also sup-
ports the application of exclusionary principles to the fruits of
nominally private searches. It is true that the source and the
scope of the federal constitutional privacy right remain con-
troverted and obscure.2  What is noteworthy, however, is that
the Montana Supreme Court's decision based upon its own consti-
tutional counterpart to the fourth amendment and its own privacy
provision 221 is as easily reached by any state court acting under its
own state constitutional authority.
CONCLUSION
Opponents of the "extension" of constitutional protections to
victims of private searches often argue that it is absurd to attempt
to deter those well-motivated individuals who, in the name of con-
scientious citizenship, gallantly seek to assist the police in their
appointed duties. In practice, however, one is hard pressed to
find heroism in the vigilante, in the private citizen who plots to
obtain information or evidence illegally in order to destroy his
neighbor, competitor, or spouse, in the security guard who se-
cretly spies on retail customers undressing in department store
changing rooms, or in the "special deputy sheriff" who flouts in-
dividual property and privacy rights without fear of significant
legal consequence.
Scores of such illegal violations of individual rights occur
daily, many resulting from the conduct of those employed to, or
merely bent upon, augmenting the enforcement of the State's
criminal laws. As the California Supreme Court recently con-
cluded in a decision applying state constitutional limitations to pri-
vate security personnel:
Unrestrained, such [private] action would subvert state author-
ity in defiance of its established limits. It would destroy the pro-
tection those carefully defined limits were intended to afford to
everyone, the guilty and innocent alike. It would afford de
facto authorizations for searches and seizures incident to arrests
2' State v. Coburn, 165 Mont. 488, 530 P.2d 442, 450 (1974) (emphasis in original).
22 See, e.g., Gerety, Redefining Privacy, 12 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. Rv. 233 (1977).
22 See note 217 supra.
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or detentions made by private individuals that even peace offic-
ers are not authorized to make.224
Private actors and those in the State's employ who tacitly or
openly encourage them can and should be deterred from unlaw-
ful activity simply by eliminating any advantage provided by such
conduct. The judiciary, moreover, need not and should not com-
promise itself by playing the part of accomplice after the fact by
using the fruits of nominally private-but nonetheless illegal-
misconduct.
From a functional perspective, perhaps state action doctrine
should be viewed pragmatically as "a tool for separating out those
nongovernmental activities whose existence so impairs certain fun-
damental values that they are proscribed by the Constitution." 22 5
Writing nearly thirty years ago, A. A. Berle similarly analyzed the
case for "constitutionalizing" private (corporate) activity that
clearly denigrated individual rights otherwise guaranteed by the
Constitution:
[C]ertain human values are protected by the American Consti-
tution; any fraction of the governmental system, economic as
well as legal, is prohibited from invading or violating them.
The principle is logical because, as has been seen, the modern
state has set up, and come to rely on, the [private] corporate
system to carry out functions for which in modern life by com-
munity demand the government is held ultimately
responsible.226
The State's ultimate responsibility for the policing function is self-
evident as a matter of sovereign authority and concomitant obliga-
tion to enforce the laws and maintain order.227
Ultimately, the classic Burdeau state action barrier to applica-
tion of constitutional limitations in the private search setting
amounts to little more than an elaborate semantical construction
based upon often incoherent doctrinal prescriptions. Indeed, the
frailty of state action doctrine makes it extremely difficult to offer
effective logical or factual proofs of the existence of state action in
challenged activity. As a result, there are obvious strains in any
12 People v. Zelinski, 24 Cal. 3d 357, 368, 594 P.2d 1000, 1006, 155 Cal. Rptr. 575, 581
(1979).
25 Glennon & Nowak, supra note 163, at 259. See also Choper. supra note 124, at 776.
226 Berle, Constitutional Limitations on Corporate Activity-Protection of Personal Rights From
Invasion Through Economic Power, 100 U. PA. L. REV. 933-943 (1952). See also Note, The
Fourth Amendment Right of Privacy: Mapping the Future, 53 VA. L. REV. 1314, 1349 (1967).
22 See text accompanying notes 128-32 supra.
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analysis that swims against the Burger Court stream by attempting
to satisfy state action criteria which are essentially unarticulated
and, perhaps, unarticulable.
Nevertheless, even under the most rigorous and uncharitable
standards, some private search activity should be characterized as
"state action" if only on the basis of stare decisis or for the sake
of superficial doctrinal consistency. The wisdom of such a finding
is compelling. Quite bluntly, what little precious liberty is pre-
served for us by judicial enforcement of fourth amendment rights
is mortally compromised if such rights can be flouted wholesale,
as they are today, by nominally private actors.
